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CHEERS! ENDING QUILL . . . WHAT CAN BE
LEARNED FROM THE WINE INDUSTRY
Alyson Outenreath*

INTRODUCTION
In today’s age of technology, does it really matter where we are physically
present? A person in rural Montana can buy items online just as if that person were
in a brick-and-mortar store in New York City, Dallas, or San Francisco. An Internet
business having only one office in Chicago could sell products to customers located
in all 50 states. Indeed, in the opening scene to Steve Jobs, a movie detailing his life,
a gentleman is seen having a discussion predicting what life will be like with
computers in the 21st century.1 The gentleman acknowledges that we will become a
computer-dependent society, which could bring about certain disadvantages, but
goes on to say this:
[The computer] will also enrich our society because it will make it
possible for us to live really anywhere we like. Any businessman
and executive could live almost anywhere on Earth and still do his
business through a [computer]. And this is a wonderful thing. It
means we won’t have to be stuck in cities. We’ll be able to live out
in the country or wherever we please.2
The prediction, which seems to have become true, was that computers will
allow us to work and do virtually all things we want to do in life, but without being
constrained to being physically present at any given location.3
So, if physical presence has become a bygone of the past, then why still talk
about it? The answer is the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.4 Quill involved whether an out-of-state office supply company selling
products to customers located in North Dakota was required to collect what are called
“use taxes” from those customers.5 Quill generated $1,000,000 in sales from
approximately 3,000 North Dakota customers for the period at issue, but it did not
have any brick-and-mortar stores or other physical presence in North Dakota.6
Instead, all sales were generated through catalog and phone orders,7 the precursor to

* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. Professor Outenreath would like to
acknowledge and thank Dean Jack Nowlin and Associate Dean Vickie Sutton for their generous support
of this project.
1. STEVE JOBS (Universal Pictures 2015).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
5. Id. at 301–02. Use taxes are discussed in detail in Part I.
6. Id. at 302.
7. Id.
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online shopping. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court held Quill was not
required to collect use taxes on the North Dakota sales because it was not physically
present in North Dakota.8 The volume of sales in the state did not matter.9 The
amount of revenues generated in the state did not matter.10 Quill being the sixth
largest office supply company in North Dakota did not matter.11 All that mattered
was whether Quill had a physical presence.12
It is probably easy to see the problem created by Quill.13 It has resulted in
large tax revenue losses to the states.14 This is because many Internet retailers may
only have physical presence in one state or a small handful of states. For example,
physical presence may exist only in the state where the company maintains its
corporate office. Or the company may have physical presence in a small handful of
states because it has a corporate office in one state and it also has a warehouse or
distribution center in other states. But despite having physical presence in only one
state, or just a small handful of states, the company may sell merchandise in many
states or perhaps in every state.15 The effect of Quill is that even though the retailer
may be selling merchandise in all these states, it would not be required to collect tax
on the sales.16 Instead, the customer would be required by law to remit the taxes
directly to the state, but this usually does not happen, the result being tax revenue
losses to the states.17
There have been many excellent articles written about why the time has
come to “Kill Quill.”18 In fact, in a 2011 Pepperdine University School of Law
8. Id. at 317–19.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id. Physical presence includes, but is not limited to, having a brick-and-mortar store, corporate
office, or distribution center in the subject state, or having employees or independent contractors in the
subject state soliciting sales or attending trade shows. See generally id. at 302. What constitutes physical
presence in order for an out-of-state company to be required to collect use taxes has been the subject of
much litigation since Quill. See generally WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
42 (10th ed. 2014).
13. See also discussion infra Part IV.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. An example of this latter situation is CafePress, Inc. Founded in 1999, CafePress is a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky. CAFEPRESS, http://www.cafepress.com (last visited
Mar. 7, 2018). The company’s manufacturing facility, also located in Louisville, serves as the fulfillment
hub for the entire United States. Id. CafePress is a retailer of various customized and personalized
products, such as t-shirts, drinkware, tote-bags, home goods, and other items. The company’s website
states that “CafePress is the world’s best online gift shop.” Id. CafePress makes nationwide sales, but due
to Quill’s physical presence standard, it collects sales and use taxes only on orders shipped to California,
Connecticut, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, and Washington. Id.
16. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying text.
17. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV.
1115 (2016); John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343 (2003); John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319 (2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Political Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1177 (2017); David Brunori, Better
Late Than Never: MTC Is Right on Sales Tax Nexus, 77 STATE TAX NOTES 1085 (2015); David Brunori,
It’s Time to Overturn Quill, 55 STATE TAX NOTES 497 (2010); Brian Hamer, It’s Time to Challenge Quill,
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Symposium, Quill was nominated as being one of the most “maligned Supreme
Court tax decisions.”19
This article seeks to provide additional support to the “Kill Quill”
movement by looking to the wine industry and the aftereffects of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald,20 a case involving wineries and their ability
to ship wine directly to customers located in other states.21
Parts I and II provide an overview of sales and use taxes, along with a
discussion about how the taxes are collected. Part III gives a history of Quill’s
physical presence standard. Part IV discusses the aftermath of Quill. Part V sets forth
observations gleaned from the aftereffects of Granholm and how these aftereffects
help support the movement to overturn Quill. Part VI provides a brief conclusion.
As mentioned above, it is important to note that overturning Quill would
not create a new tax.22 The media sometimes inaccurately reports this.23 What many
consumers may not realize is that they are already responsible for paying, directly to
the state, any taxes not collected by out-of-state retailers.24 The only reason
consumers might think a reversal of Quill would create a new tax is because they are
not aware of their already existing responsibility to directly remit uncollected taxes.25
This is a critical point in understanding the debate concerning Quill: overturning
Quill would not create a new tax, it would only create a better way to collect the
tax.26

76 STATE TAX NOTES 531 (2015); Billy Hamilton, Goodbye, Quill—One Way or the Other, 84 STATE
TAX NOTES 379 (2017) (“It’s long past time to say goodbye to Quill, which was issued not just in another
century but almost another world.”); John A. Swain, Quexit: The Time Has Come, 81 STATE TAX NOTES
695 (2016); Julie P. Magee, The Supreme Court Should Fix the Problem (Quill) It Created, TAX NOTES
(Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/nexus/supreme-court-should-fix-problemquill-it-created/2016/10/24/2gk0.
19. Paul L. Caron, Pepperdine Hosts Symposium on The Most Maligned Supreme Court Decisions,
TAX PROF BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/
2011/04/supreme-mistakes.html (providing this quote by well-known state and local tax scholar John
Swain: “The case requires out-of-state sellers to have an in-state physical presence before they can be
required to collect sales tax from their in-state customers. As a result, mail-order and internet sellers enjoy
a de facto sales tax exemption that gives them an unfair competitive advantage over brick-and-mortar
retailers and states are losing billions of dollars of revenue. In today’s world, the notion that physical
presence is a reasonable proxy for determining the level of a seller’s compliance burdens is absurd, and
decades before the Quill decision the Court had rejected the physical presence test with respect to other
types of jurisdictional questions, such as personal jurisdiction and state (non-tax) regulatory
jurisdiction.”); see also David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation
of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 485 (2012) (citing the aforementioned Pepperdine School of Law
symposium).
20. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
21. Id.
22. See discussion infra Part II.
23. See, e.g., U.S. Senate to Consider Marketplace Fairness Act, FOX NEWS (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://video.foxnews.com/v/2322223032001/?#sp=show-clips.
24. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 44.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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I. SALES AND USE TAXES
Most of us are familiar with sales taxes.27 We see sales taxes imposed and
reflected on our receipts when we dine at restaurants or shop at stores at the local
mall.28 But consumers likely are not as familiar with use taxes.29
States that impose sales taxes also impose use taxes.30 Use taxes function
the same as sales taxes in that they are imposed on the purchase of the same items.31
The difference between the two has to do with where the sale taxes place.32 If a sale
takes place within a state’s taxing jurisdiction, such as when an individual make a
purchase at the local mall, then the state’s sales tax applies.33 On the other hand, if a
sale takes place outside of a state’s taxing jurisdiction, such as when a Pennsylvania
resident purchases a coat in Delaware (a state that happens not to have a sales and
use tax system) and then takes the coat back to Pennsylvania (a state having a sales
and use tax system), then Pennsylvania’s use tax applies.34
Use taxes are imposed on the use, storage, or other consumption of taxable
items in the state where sales tax was not paid at the time of purchase.35 In the above
example involving the Pennsylvania resident, when the resident returns home and
wears the coat (i.e., uses the item), Pennsylvania use tax would become due.36 The
amount of use tax the Pennsylvania resident must pay is the same amount of sales
tax that would have been paid had the sale occurred in Pennsylvania.37 But instead
of the tax being collected by the retailer at the time of purchase, the Pennsylvania
resident would be required to remit the taxes directly to the state within a certain
number of days after purchase.38 The collection of sales versus use taxes is discussed
more in Part II.
As a result, the difference between sales taxes versus use taxes has been
described as one of jurisdiction.39 If a state has jurisdiction to tax the sale, then sales
27. See id. at 647.
28. See id.
29. See discussion infra Part II.
30. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 785–86.
31. See id. (“Compensating use taxes are functionally equivalent to sales taxes. They are typically
levied upon the use, storage, or other consumption in the state of tangible personal property that has not
been subjected to a sales tax. The use tax imposes an exaction equal in amount to the sales tax that would
have been imposed on the sale of the property in question if the sale had occurred within the state’s taxing
jurisdiction.”)
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. (“The use tax imposes an exaction equal in amount to the sales tax that would have been
imposed on the sale of the property in question if the sale had occurred within the state’s taxing
jurisdiction. The state overcomes the constitutional hurdle of taxing an out-of-state or interstate sale by
imposing the tax on a subject within its taxing power—the use, storage, or consumption of property within
the state.”).
38. Alternatively, states with personal income tax systems sometimes allow residents to remit the
taxes on the same tax form and at the same time with the remittance of income taxes. See discussion infra
Part II.
39. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 785–86.
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tax is due.40 If the sale instead occurs outside the state’s jurisdiction, but the
purchased item is then used in the state (such as wearing the coat in the above
example), then use tax is due.41 Because use taxes essentially “pick up where sales
taxes leave off,”42 use taxes are oftentimes statutorily titled with the name
“complimentary use taxes” or “compensating use taxes.”43 The terms
“complimentary” or “compensating” mean that use taxes compliment sales tax
systems by compensating where sales taxes are not collected.44 As seen in the
Delaware/Pennsylvania example, in-state residents do not benefit from a tax
perspective by traveling to states not having sales tax systems to purchase items
because the consumer ultimately is liable for the payment of use taxes when he/she
returns home.45 A similar result arises with Internet purchases, which is discussed in
Part II.46
Today, 45 states and the District of Columbia have sales and use tax systems
(no state has a sales tax system, but not a use tax system).47 The only states not having
sales and use tax systems are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and
Oregon.48
Sales and use taxes account for a large portion of state government tax
revenue.49 For example, in 2016, sales and use taxes accounted for approximately
30% of total state tax collections.50 In both 2015 and 2014, the number also was
approximately 30%.51 In some states, the percentage was even higher.52 For example,
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. The need for complementary and compensating use taxes dates back to the 1930’s. See id.
This excerpt from a leading state and local tax casebook gives an excellent summary of the history behind
use taxes:
When states first adopted sales taxes during the 1930’s, they encountered a troublesome
gap in the sales tax structure attributable to the constitutional strictures prohibiting them
from taxing sales consummated outside their borders or in interstate commerce. The
gap created two concerns. First, states feared the loss of business that local merchants
would suffer when prospective customers made out-of-state or interstate purchases to
avoid local sales tax liability. Second, states feared the loss of revenue they would incur
as a result of the diversion of sales tax to nontax states. . . . To deal with this potential
loss of business revenue, states enacted ‘complementary’ or ‘compensating’ use taxes.
See id. at 785.
44. See, e.g., id.
45. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
46. See discussion infra Part II.
47. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 651, 785–86.
48. See id. at 651.
49. See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
50. See 2016 State Government Tax Collections, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 12, 2017),
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=STC_2016_11A1&pr
odType=table.
51. See 2015 State Government Tax Collections, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=STC_2015_00A1&pr
odType=table; 2014 State Government Tax Collections, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=STC_2014_00A1&pr
odType=table.
52. See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text; see also Susan Pace Hamill, The Vast Injustice
Perpetuated by State and Local Tax Policy, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 131 (2008); Sara Schoenfield, Much
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in 2014, the following states were over the 50% mark: Florida (60%); Nevada (53%);
South Dakota (56%); Tennessee (52%); Texas (58%); Washington (60%).53 And
other states were approaching the 50% mark: Arizona (47%); Hawaii (46%); Indiana
(41%); Kansas (40%); Mississippi (43%).54 These statistics are for state tax
collections only.55 Local governments (e.g., cities and counties) also rely on sales
and use tax revenues.56 Of the 45 states that levy sales and use taxes at the state level,
approximately two-thirds also levy the taxes at the local level.57
Sales and use taxes are generally imposed on the retail purchase of what is
commonly called tangible personal property.58 Tangible personal property means
items that can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched or that are perceptible to
the senses.59 Most states also impose sales and use taxes on the retail purchase of
certain services, but the imposition of tax on services continues to remain an
exception rather than a general rule.60
II.

COLLECTION OF SALES AND USE TAXES

Sales and use taxes are typically paid by the end-user consumer.61 Consider
this simple example for sales taxes.62 Individual goes to a local bicycle shop down
the street, ABC Bicycle Shop, and purchases a bicycle. Sales taxes resulting from
the sale are imposed on and paid by Individual.63 Nevertheless, even though sales
taxes are paid by Individual, it is ABC Bicycle Shop’s responsibility, as the retailer,
to collect the taxes and remit them to the state.64 We all experience this phenomenon
in our everyday lives when we see the line item on our receipts showing the sales
taxes we paid, but instead of us paying the taxes directly to the taxing agency (like

Ado About Nexus: The States Struggle to Impose Sales Tax Obligations on Out-of-State Sellers Engaged
in E-Commerce, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 260, 277 (2013) (citing Hamill, supra).
53. See, e.g., Jared Walczak, Unpacking the State and Local Tax Toolkit: Sources of State and Local
Tax Collections, TAX FOUNDATION (June 20, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/toolkit-sources-state-localtax-collections/. These cited percentages have incorporated figures for taxes levied on the purchase of
goods and services as well as special taxes levied on gross receipts. See id. (“While economists generally
draw sharp delineations among general sales taxes, excise taxes, and gross receipts taxes, the U.S. Census
Bureau does not distinguish between taxes levied on sales and those imposed on gross receipts. Due to
these data limitations, this category includes both general sales taxes and certain gross receipts taxes,
though excise taxes are considered separately.”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 652.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 658.
59. Texas has a typical statute. It defines “tangible personal property” to mean:
“personal property that can be seen, weighted, measured, felt, or touched or that is perceptible to the senses
in any other manner. . . .” 151 TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.009 (West).
60. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 658.
61. See id. at 649–50.
62. See discussion supra Part I for the difference between sales taxes and use taxes.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 780–81. States then transfer the local portion of the
collected taxes to the various local jurisdictions, such as cities and counties.
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we do with federal income taxes, for example), the retailer collects the taxes from us
as a collection agent and remits the taxes to the taxing agency on our behalf.65
The collection of use taxes is different.66 Assume Individual in the above
example buys the bicycle on the Internet. For purposes of this example, assume the
Internet company is located in California and Individual lives in Florida. The Internet
company would be required to act as the collection agent for collecting use taxes due
on the purchase only if it has what is known as “physical presence” in Florida.67 For
this purpose, physical presence means situations including, but not limited to, the
company having a brick-and-mortar store or distribution center in Florida.68 In
contrast, if the company does not have a physical presence in the buyer’s state so as
to cause the “collection agent” responsibility to kick in, then the buyer is required to
remit the use taxes due directly to the state taxing authority.69 So in the above
example, Individual would be responsible for paying use taxes due on the purchase
of the bicycle directly to the Florida Department of Revenue.70 This is generally
accomplished by filing a “Use Tax Return.”71 An example Use Tax Return for Texas
is reproduced below:

65. See id.
66. See discussion infra Part III.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Some states allow reporting and payment of use taxes in other ways. For example, some allow
use taxes to be reported and paid via state personal income tax returns. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, http://www.dor.state.nc.us/taxes/sales/use.html (stating “An individual
required to file Form D-400, North Carolina Individual Income Tax Return, must report the use tax
liability on non-business purchases of taxable items, other than a boat, an aircraft, and food subject to the
reduced rate of tax, on the individual’s income tax return.”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
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Notably, the instructions to the Texas Use Tax Return do an admirable job
describing what the use tax is and what it is imposed on:
[The use tax is a] tax, complementary to the sales tax, imposed on
taxable goods and services that are purchased, leased or rented for
personal or business use, storage or consumption in Texas on
which Texas sales or use tax has not previously been paid. . . .
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Examples of items subject to use tax include purchases made over the
Internet or the telephone from an out-of-state seller who does not collect tax and
items purchased while visiting another state or country.72
This dichotomy where a retailer is required to collect use taxes only when
it has physical presence in the customer’s state is a result of two U.S. Supreme Court
cases: National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue73 and Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.74 These cases are discussed in Part III.
As already mentioned, consumers likely are not as familiar with use taxes
as they are with sales taxes.75 In an NPR Planet Money segment from 2013, it was
reported that in the 45 states having sales and use tax systems, only approximately
1.6% of taxpayers in those states actually pay use tax.76 Many simply do not know
about the tax.77 Another problem is enforcement.78 It would simply cost too much
for state taxing agencies to audit individuals to see what they purchased online or
otherwise without paying use tax.79
State and local government tax revenue loss from uncollected use taxes is
large.80 The lost revenue means state and local governments have fewer resources to
spend on necessary services such as public education, police protection, and road
repairs.81 Or it may mean the revenue loss is offset by enacting new taxes, increasing
existing tax rates, or broadening the tax base of existing taxes. Due to the prevalence
of online shopping, a large portion of revenue losses likely comes from e-commerce
transactions.82
The precise amount of losses from unreported use taxes is unknown.83 In
2010, it was reported that state and local governments were losing more than $7

72. TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, TEXAS USE TAX RETURN,
https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/sales/forms/ (follow “Use Tax Return”; then follow “01-156, Texas
Use Tax Return) (last visited May 1, 2018).
73. National Bellas Hess v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
74. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
75. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
76. Chana Joffe-Walt, Most People are Supposed to Pay This Tax. Almost Nobody Actually Pays It.,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/04/16/
177384487/most-people-are-supposed-to-pay-this-tax; see also Zhang Yilu, An Analysis of Quill and
Federal Remote Sales Tax Legislation, TAX ANALYSTS (July 4, 2016), http://www.
taxanalysts.org/content/analysis-quill-and-federal-remote-sales-tax-legislation (reporting same 1.6%
compliance figure).
77. Joffe-Walt, supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 785.
79. Ross Ramsey, Analysis: Who Actually Owes State Sales Tax? Hint: It’s Not Retailers, TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/12/19/analysis-dont-blame-retailers/.
80. See infra notes 83–97 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Rebecca Helmes, Sales Tax Slice: How Much Revenue Do States (Really) Lose From
Remote Sales?, BNA SALT TALK BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014) (quoting Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.)
at the Exploring Alternative Solutions on the Internet Sales Tax Issue hearing),
https://www.bna.com/sales-tax-slice-b17179889384/.
82. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 814 (“The most significant problem of evasion of use
taxes is the states’ inability to collect taxes on out-of-state mail-order and Internet sales.”).
83. See, e.g., Helmes, supra note 81.
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billion per year.84 According to a more recent study by the University of Tennessee
and the National Conference of State Legislatures, the estimated amount of revenue
loss nationwide from e-commerce alone was $11.39 billion in 2012, and this figure
rose to $23.26 billion when all transactions (meaning e-commerce and otherwise)
were taken into account.85 In the four largest states by population,86 the estimated
loss figures were as follows:
State
California
Texas
Florida
New York

Estimated Annual State and Local
Government Revenue Loss
E-Commerce: $1,904500,000
All Transactions: $4,159,667,947
E-Commerce: $870,400,000
All Transactions: $1,777,090,593
E-Commerce: $803,800,000
All Transactions: $1,483,690,010
E-Commerce: $865,500,000
All Transactions: $1,766,968,25187

It should be noted that the Tennessee study has been criticized for allegedly
over-exaggerating losses.88 Although, another study conducted by the National
Conference of State Legislatures and the International Council of Shopping Centers
had similar findings in a report released in March 2017.89 The study found that in
2015 states lost approximately $26 billion in uncollected taxes from online or remote
sellers.90
But even if tax revenue losses may not be as high as reported in these
studies, it is clear that state and local governments have lost tax revenue.91 Further
84. Michael Mazerov, Amazon’s Arguments Against Collecting Sales Taxes Do Not Withstand
Scrutiny, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/research/
amazons-arguments-against-collecting-sales-taxes-do-not-withstand-scrutiny.
85. Helmes, supra note 81.
86. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 10 MILLION PEOPLE (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/
dam/Census/newsroom/releases/2015/cb15-215_graphic.jpg.
87. Collecting E-Commerce Taxes | E-Fairness Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/collecting-ecommerce-taxesan-interactive-map.aspx#2 (providing data from University of Tennessee study); see also DONALD BRUCE
ET AL., UNIV. OF TENN., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SALES TAX REVENUE LOSSES FROM
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2009), http://cber.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom0409.pdf.
88. See, e.g., Scott T. Allen, Adapting to the Internet: Why Legislation is Needed to Address the
Preference for Online Sales that Deprives States of Tax Revenue, 66 TAX LAW. 939, 942 (2013) (citing
another study criticizing the University of Tennessee study where revenue losses were estimated at $4.7
billion in 2012).
89. See Che Odom, $26 Billion in Sales Taxes Not Collected from Remote Sellers, BLOOMBERG BNA,
Mar. 24, 2017.
90. See id.
91. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text; see also Billy Hamilton, 4 Threats to the Sales
Tax’s Future, TAX NOTES (Nov. 28, 2016) (“Whether the amount is larger or smaller than previously
estimated, the states are losing tax dollars because of remote sales, and the potential growth of online
shopping poses an ongoing threat because peak online sales still lie ahead. In February, the U.S.
Commerce Department reported that e-commerce sales in 2015 totaled $341.7 billion and accounted for
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adding fuel to the fire is the projection by the non-partisan organization, National
Association of State Budget Officers, that nearly half the states are projected to have
budget shortfalls for the 2018 fiscal year.92
States view this problem as requiring immediate attention.93 As stated by
Julie Magee, former Commissioner for the Alabama Department of Revenue:
The reason we are frustrated and feel a sense of urgency is because
our sales tax base has eroded . . . [Alabama is] now collecting onethird of the economy in our sales tax world, where in the 70s we
were collecting two-thirds of the economy.94
Revenue losses are most significant in states that do not levy state-level
personal income taxes and, therefore, rely more on sales tax collections.95 Texas is
one of these states, with it being estimated for the 2016-2017 budget cycle that 53%
of Texas’s $108 billion estimated revenue will come from sales and use taxes.96 In
2014, Texas estimated a reversal of Quill would produce an additional $800 million
for the state and an additional $200 million for local governments.97
III.

HISTORY OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR
USE TAX COLLECTION

Opening remarks by Representative Lamar Smith from a 2012 House
Judiciary Committee assembly where witnesses testified on the physical presence
nexus standard for use tax collection serves as a useful introduction:
In the 1992 case, Quill v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held
that under the dormant commerce clause a state may not compel a
retailer to collect and remit the state sales tax if the retailer lacks a
physical presence in the state. In the Supreme Court’s view, to
force a retailer to collect and remit taxes to more than 9,000 state,
county, and local taxing jurisdictions throughout the county places
a serious burden on the retailer’s ability to sell in interstate
commerce. Quill’s bright-line physical presence rule for tax
collection makes sense for small businesses that cannot afford to

only 7.3 percent of total retail sales. Excluding items not normally bought online, such as fuel and
automobiles, e-commerce accounted for more than 10 percent of retail sales, leaving a lot of room for
growth. And that seems to be the direction the trend is headed. Online sales are growing far more rapidly
than sales at bricks-and-mortar stores, rising 14.6 percent in 2015 compared with total retail sales growth
of 1.5 percent. Online sales accounted for 60.4 percent of total sales growth.”).
92. Gretchen Frazee, Nearly Half of the States Are Facing Budget Shortfalls. Here’s Why that
Matters, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/nearly-half-of-statesare-facing-a-budget-shortfall-heres-why-that-matters/.
93. Laura Davison, States, Retailers Continue to Spar as Online Sales Grow, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-retailers-continue-n57982086624/.
94. Id.
95. Maria Halkias, Texas Still Missing Out On $1 Billion a Year from Online Shopping Sales Taxes,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 24, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/retail/2017/
05/24/getting-e-commerce-sites-collect-sales-taxes-still-issue-congress-courts-resolve.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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track and comply with 9,000 different tax codes as a cost of doing
business throughout the country. The constitution does not allow
one state to reach into the pockets of another state’s retailers to
exact taxation without representation. But brick-and-mortar
retailers claim that the physical presence rule creates an un-level
playing field between them and their online retailer counterparts.
Online retailers, who maintain a very limited physical presence
and use common carriers to fill orders, enjoy and competitive
advantage over traditional retailers. This is because most states
cannot compel the online retailer to collect and remit its sales tax
and neighborhood brick-and-mortar stores, meanwhile, must
collect and remit taxes on all purchases. Moreover, state and local
governments view the taxes they cannot collect on most online
sales as lost revenue. It is true that online consumers owe a use tax
to the state in which they reside. But data shows that use taxes are
easily avoided, rarely paid, and difficult to enforce. The Court’s
decision in Quill was based on the observation that compliance
with numerous taxing jurisdiction’s laws would be burdensome
and confusing. The Constitution does not require a physical
presence standard as a tax collection criterion. Congress may pass
legislation that uses a different standard under its power to regulate
interstate commerce.98
While these opening remarks reference the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992
decision in Quill, the history of the physical presence nexus standard for use tax
collection actually goes back to 1967 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
National Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue.99 These two cases are discussed separately
below.
a.

National Bellas Hess

National Bellas Hess (“Bellas Hess”) was a mail order company having its
principal place of business in Missouri.100 It was also licensed to do business in
Delaware.101 The state at issue was Illinois.102 Bellas Hess did not have offices or
any other physical presence in Illinois.103 Bellas Hess’s connection to Illinois
consisted of bi-annually mailing catalogues to its active, past, and potential Illinois
customers.104 These mailings were supplemented with advertising flyers.105 Illinois
customers desiring to purchase merchandise submitted order forms by mail that

98. House Judiciary Committee, Taxation of Online Retailers, CSPAN (July 24, 2012),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?307223-1/taxation-online-retailers&start=6703.
99. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
100. Id. at 753–54.
101. Id. at 754.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 754–55.
105. Id.
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Bellas Hess accepted at its Missouri office.106 The merchandise was delivered either
by mail or common carrier.107
The Illinois Department of Revenue (“Illinois DOR”) determined Bellas
Hess was a “retailer” for Illinois sales and use tax purposes, which in turn required
Bellas Hess to collect and remit Illinois use taxes on sales to Illinois customers.108
The Illinois DOR based this determination on a statute that declared the following as
an activity creating retailer status: “Engaging in soliciting orders within this State
from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are
received or accepted within or without this State.”109 Bellas Hess brought suit
claiming the statute was unconstitutional and it did not have sufficient nexus with
Illinois to be subject to the use tax collection requirement under Due Process and
Commerce Clause grounds.110 The Illinois Supreme Court held in favor of the Illinois
DOR.111 The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed, holding in favor of Bellas Hess,
finding that an out-of-state retailer cannot be held responsible for collecting use taxes
unless the retailer has a “physical presence” in the state.112
In reaching its decision, the Court first summarized what the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses require and observed that it had previously upheld the power
of a state to impose a use tax collection responsibility in a variety of circumstances.113
But it further observed that it had not previously upheld a use tax collection
responsibility where the out-of-state company’s connection with the subject state
was only by common carrier or mail (i.e., no physical presence).114 The Court cited
Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Montgomery Ward & Co. as an example where this latter
type of fact pattern had been differentiated from those where the seller had local
retail stores in the subject state (i.e., physical presence).115 Ultimately holding in
favor of Bellas Hess, the Court cited to Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, a case
where the Court previously struck down a use tax collection responsibility even
though the out-of-state company delivered merchandise in its own company trucks
driven by employee drivers instead of delivering merchandise by common carrier.116
106. Id.
107. Id. at 755.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also ILL. REV. STAT. c. 120 § 439.2 (1965). The statute has since been amended to remove
the quoted definition. See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/2 (1992)).
110. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
111. Id. at 754.
112. Id. at 758–60. When an out-of-state company has sufficient physical presence in a state to be
required to collect use taxes, it is oftentimes referred to as the out-of-state company having sufficient
“nexus” in the state.
113. Id. at 757. Noted circumstances included were: (i) sales were arranged by local agents in the
subject state; (ii) a mail order business had local retail stores in the subject state; and (iii) an out-of-state
business had 10 wholesalers, jobbers, or salesmen in the subject state who conducted continuous local
solicitation. Id. at 757–58.
114. Id. at 758.
115. Id. (citing Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)).
116. Id. at 758–60 (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)). Query whether delivery
in the company vehicles was occasional or not. See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers,
Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1135 (2016) (“Not surprisingly, Miller Brothers played
a prominent role in the briefing and oral argument of Bellas Hess. Taxpayers had few Supreme Court
victories upholding their right not to collect the use tax, so even if Miller Brothers was hardly a model of
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The analysis being: if a use tax collection responsibility was not imposed in Miller
Brothers, then how could logic dictate the imposition under the facts of Bellas
Hess?117
The Court also cited concerns with administrative burdens:
[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon [Bellas
Hess] were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free
conduct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary nor
remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other
State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district,
and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with
power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates
of tax, in allowable exemptions and in administrative and recordkeeping requirements could entangle Bellas Hess’ interstate
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local
jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose ‘a fair share of the
cost of the local government.118
The analysis in Bellas Hess is somewhat difficult to follow, especially
because the Court never explained why Miller Brothers was correctly decided.119
Indeed, in his article Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, Professor
Richard D. Pomp described the majority’s opinion in Bellas Hess as “unimaginative
and hardly intellectually bold.”120
Additionally, the Court’s analysis of the administrative burden rationale
seemed incomplete as it did not explain how a company’s physical presence in a state
would magically and suddenly make any administrative burdens disappear.121 As
Professor Pomp further observed in Revisiting, “[h]ow this [administrative] burden
would be reduced if there were ten part-time independent solicitors in the state was
unaddressed.”122

analytical rigor, as well as a 5-4 decision, it was nonetheless a recent—and favorable—precedent.”). In
response to the application of Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess maintained the case didn’t stand for the
proposition argued by the Illinois DOR because the use of company vehicles was occasional. See id. at
1136 (“In his brief and at oral argument, Professor Cox [representing Bellas Hess] argued that Miller
Brothers ‘should govern the present case,’ and emphasized that Miller Brothers ‘made regular deliveries
in Maryland in its own truck driven by its own employees.’ He rejected [previous] characterization of
Miller Brothers’ deliveries in Maryland as ‘occasional.’ Instead, Cox re-characterized the deliveries (more
accurately) as ‘regular.’ By underscoring, rather than trivializing, the store’s deliveries (as well as its
advertising), Professor Cox was able to state at oral argument: ‘If continuous regular advertising plus
delivery with your own trucks is not enough to make jurisdiction . . . then surely [there cannot be
jurisdiction] where you don’t make deliver[ies] with your own truck.”). In response, the Illinois DOR took
the position that the deliveries in company trucks in Miller Brothers wasn’t regular, but instead occasional.
See id. at 1136–37.
117. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 758–60 (1967); see also, e.g., Pomp, supra note 116,
at 1136–37.
118. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60.
119. See supra notes 99–118 and accompanying text.
120. Pomp, supra note 116, at 1137.
121. See supra notes 99–118 and accompanying text.
122. Pomp, supra note 116, at 1138.
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Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

Approximately 25 years after Bellas Hess, the U.S. Supreme Court took up
the physical presence issue again in Quill, having to decide whether a use tax
collection responsibility could be imposed on an out-of-state (also known as remote)
office supply catalog retailer.123
Quill involved a Delaware corporation that had offices and warehouses in
California, Georgia, and Illinois.124 It did not have any employees who worked or
resided in North Dakota.125 It did not own real property in North Dakota and its
ownership of tangible property in North Dakota was either insignificant or
nonexistent.126 Quill sold office supplies and equipment, soliciting business through
catalogs, flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls.127 It
delivered merchandise to North Dakota customers by mail or common carrier.128 At
the time of the case, Quill was the sixth largest office supply vendor in North
Dakota.129 Its annual national sales surpassed $200,000,000, out of which
approximately $1,000,000 were made to roughly 3,000 North Dakota customers.130
In 1987, North Dakota amended its Tax Code to require “every person who
engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state” to
collect sales and use taxes.131 The term “regular or systematic solicitation” was
defined to mean three or more advertisements within a 12- month period.132
Consequently, Quill became required to collect and remit use taxes on sales to North
Dakota customers.133
Quill brought suit arguing North Dakota did not have the power to compel
it to collect use taxes because it did not have nexus with North Dakota under the Due
Process Clause or Commerce Clause.134 Quill won at the trial court level on the basis
that the case was indistinguishable from Bellas Hess.135 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, found in favor of the State concluding that “wholesale changes” in
both the law and economy made it inappropriate for Bellas Hess to continue to be
followed.136 The observed economic change was “the remarkable growth of the mail
order business from a relatively inconsequential market niche in 1967 to a goliath
with annual sales that reached the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989.”137
Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court felt “advances in computer
technology greatly eased the burden of compliance with a welter of complicated
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1992).
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302–03.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 302–04.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
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obligations imposed by state and local taxing authorities.”138 The North Dakota
Supreme Court ultimately concluded Quill’s “economic presence” in North Dakota
made it appropriate to impose a use tax collection responsibility.139
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the North Dakota Supreme and
found in favor of Quill.140 In reaching its decision, the Court first discussed the
relationship between the Due Process and Commerce Clauses in the context of the
nexus requirement and concluded each clause requires separate analysis.141 With
respect to the Due Process Clause nexus requirement, the Court observed that it
“requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”142 and that the “income attributed to
the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the
taxing State.”143 The Court stated it was “concerned primarily with the first of these
requirements.”144 The Court observed that previous cases touching on this
requirement involved facts where some sort of physical presence existed in the
subject state and, indeed, Bellas Hess appeared to require this.145 However, the Court
went on to note that Due Process Clause jurisprudence had substantially evolved
since Bellas Hess, and based on those developments in the area of judicial
jurisdiction, “we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a
defendant’s ‘presence’ within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether
a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable in the context of our federal
system of government, to require it to defend the suit in that State” and “have held
that if a foreign corporation purposely avails itself of the benefits of an economic
market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in personam jurisdiction
even if it has no physical presence in the State.”146 The Court noted that due process
analysis involves “notice” or “fair warning” and that “at the most general level, the
due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual’s connections
with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State’s exercise of power over
him.”147 Applying this due process nexus standard to Quill, the Court concluded it
had nexus in North Dakota for Due Process Clause purposes.148

138. Id.
139. Id. at 304.
140. Id. at 319.
141. Id. at 305 (“The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally in several ways . . . Thus,
although we have not always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.”); see also HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 41 (“Prior to
Quill, the Court had considered the nexus requirement as an element of both its Due Process and
Commerce Clause doctrines, and it had never indicated that there was any distinction in the meaning of
the nexus requirement under either clause. Indeed, it had suggested precisely the opposite. . . .”).
142. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 306–07 (“These cases all involved some sort of physical presence within the State, and in
Bellas Hess the Court suggested that such presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause, but also necessary.”).
146. Id. at 307.
147. Id. at 312.
148. Id. at 308.
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The Court then turned to analyzing the nexus requirement under the
Commerce Clause, which “prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate
commerce.”149 In describing the difference between the nexus requirement for Due
Process Clause and Commerce Clause purposes, the Court stated that the Commerce
Clause nexus requirement was not concerned with notice or fair warning, but instead
with “structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national
economy” and that it “prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and bars
state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”150
The Court also addressed the suggestion by the North Dakota Supreme
Court that the Court’s 1977 decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274 (1977) had rendered Bellas Hess obsolete for Commerce Clause purposes
and that the physical presence standard was no longer required in order for a State to
impose a use tax collection responsibility.151 The Court disagreed with this analysis
holding Bellas Hess remained good law.152
By declaring that Bellas Hess remained good law as to the Commerce
Clause nexus requirement, this then led the way for the Court to conclude that
physical presence continued to be the appropriate standard for determining whether
an out-of-state seller would be held responsible for the collection of use taxes.153 The
Court summarized its holding as follows:
In sum, although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and
concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar
bright-line physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those
cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess
established in the area of sales and use taxes. To the contrary, the
continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine
and principles of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule
remains good law. For these reasons, we disagree with the North
Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the time has come to
renounce the bright-line test of Bellas Hess.154
The Court also commented on the benefit of the bright-line physical
presence rule established in Bellas Hess, even though it admitted the bright-line rule
was “artificial at its edges:”
Like other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial
at its edges: whether or not a State may compel a vendor to collect
a sales or use tax may turn on the presence in the taxing State of a
small sales force, plant, or offices. . . . This artificiality, however,
is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such as rule
firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to
impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation
concerning those taxes. . . . Moreover, a bight-line rule in the area
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 314–19.
Id. at 317–18.
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of sale and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in
doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals. Indeed,
it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry’s dramatic growth
over the last quarter-century is due in part to the bright-line
exemption from state taxation created in Bellas Hess.155
Interestingly, in the end the Court seemed as if it might not have full
confidence in its decision by inviting Congress to change the result, stating “our
decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that
Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the
ultimate power to resolve.”156
Also interesting is that the Court further seemed to suggest that it might
have reached a different decision if Quill had been a case of first impression.157
IV.

THE AFTERMATH: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER QUILL?

The aftermath of Quill has brought about illogical results and revenue losses
to the states.158
i.

Illogical Results

Both Bellas Hess and Quill failed to explain how a bright-line physical
presence rule for use tax collection magically causes administrative burdens to
disappear.159 Consider these hypotheticals:
Hypothetical 1: You may be familiar with the GEICO®
commercial where the well-known gecko appears on historic State
Street in downtown Bristol.160

155. Id. at 315–16.
156. Id. at 318; see also, e.g.,’Economic Presence’ Enough for Sales Tax? Relying on Quill May Be
Hazardous, TAX EXEC. (Aug 24, 2016), http://taxexecutive.org/economic-presence-enough-for-sales-taxrelying-on-quill-may-be-hazardous/ (“When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Quill, it expressed
some doubt, recognizing that commerce was becoming less dependent on traditional sales at brick-andmortar companies. The Court invited Congress to clarify nexus for sales tax purposes, but so far Congress
has not done so.”).
157. Id. at 311 (“While contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same
result were the issue to arise for the first time today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto
and our recent cases.”).
158. See also HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 42 (discussing the barrage of litigation after Quill
regarding what constitutes physical presence).
159. See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 116, at 1145.
160. Discover Bristol, GEICO Gecko in Downtown Bristol, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=v0Qdm E14DOs (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
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An historic feature of State Street, which is like a downtown Main
Street, is that the middle of the street marks the official state line
between Tennessee and Virginia.161 So there is a Bristol,
Tennessee and a Bristol, Virginia.162 Because of the uniqueness of
the state line being in the middle of the street, you can actually be
in two states at the same time.163 Indeed, in the GEICO®
commercial the gecko jumps back and forth between Tennessee
and Virginia eventually standing in the middle of the street
declaring that he’s in “Virginessee” or “Tenniginia.”164 Because
the street is lined with shops, an interesting result can occur for
sales and use tax collection purposes. Assume there is a brick-andmortar store on the Virginia side (and assume this is the only brick
and mortar location) that sells antique clocks both in the Virginia
storefront and online. Further assume that a Tennessee resident
orders a clock from the store online. Because the store only has
physical presence in Virginia, it would not be required to collect
and remit Tennessee use tax on the online order even though the
seller is physically located on a street half of which is actually in
Tennessee, and most likely has Tennessee residents crossing the
street on a regular basis to come into the store.165
Hypothetical 2: Assume there is a small Internet business
located in Clovis, New Mexico. The business has no brick-andmortar stores and 100% of its sales are from online orders. The
business sells collegiate fleece pullovers and 90% of its business
comes from orders made by residents located in Lubbock, Texas
where Texas Tech University is located.166 Clovis is located 9
miles west of the Texas border and the driving distance between
161. See, e.g., Tenniginia or Virginessee?, DISCOVER BRISTOL, http://discoverbristol.org/tenniginiaor-virginessee/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Discover Bristol, supra note 160.
165. See discussion supra Part II.
166. TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY, https://www.ttu.edu (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
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Clovis and Lubbock is approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes.167
The other 10% of sales are to residents in various other Texas
cities. Even though 100% of the company’s sales are to Texas
residents and it is only 9 miles west of the Texas border, the
company would not be required to collect and remit Texas sales
and use taxes on the sales.168
Hypothetical 3: Assume an Internet business has its
headquarters in Washington state. It also has physical presence in
4 other states by way of warehouses and distribution centers.
Despite having physical presence in only 5 states, it has “economic
presence” in all 50 states because it makes sales to customers
nationwide. Further assume that sales for the 4 most recent
quarters were $21.7 billion nationwide. This fact pattern describes
Amazon back in 2009.169 In 2009, Amazon collected sales and use
taxes in only 5 states, despite generating $21.7 billion in sales
nationwide.170
These hypotheticals, while perhaps extreme, illustrate the illogical results
arising under Quill.171 In Hypothetical 1, how is it administratively burdensome to
require a business to collect and remit sales and use taxes on the online Tennessee
sale when it is already collecting and remitting taxes in Virginia (right across the
street)? In Hypothetical 2, how is it administratively burdensome to require the
business to collect and remit sales and use taxes in the only state where it has sales?
In Hypothetical 3, how is it administratively burdensome to require a business
generating $21.7 billion in sales nationwide to collect and remit sales and use taxes?
Businesses have argued that the administrative burden involves them being required
to know the sales and use tax rates and reporting rules in each state, including various
local jurisdictions.172 But is this not simply a cost of doing business? In fact,
businesses have other logistics to decipher, such as how to compute shipping charges
and how to logistically deliver products on time to destinations across the county.

167. See MAPQUEST, https://www.mapquest.com (search for “Clovis, NM”; then follow “directions”;
then search for “Lubbock, Texas”) (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
168. See discussion supra Part II.
169. See, e.g., Randall Stross, Sorry, Shoppers, but Why Can’t Amazon Collect More Tax?, NEW YORK
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/business/27digi.html.
170. Id. Amazon now collects sales and use taxes in 46 states (as of June 2017) and supports federal
legislation to overturn Quill. See, e.g., About Tax, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer
/display.html?nodeId=468512 (providing list of states where taxes are collected) (last visited June 13,
2017); Tim Worstall, Amazon’s in Favor of the Online Sales Tax Bill Now, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/10/26/amazons-in-favour-of-the-online-sales-tax-billnow/#7b59fce03208.
171. See discussion supra Part II.
172. See, e.g., Zhang Yilu, An Analysis of Quill and Federal Remote Sales Tax Legislation, Tax
Analysts (July 4, 2016), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/analysis-quill-and-federal-remote-sales-taxlegislation.
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How is sales and use tax collection any different, especially when computer software
is available to electronically compute and remit required taxes?173
Businesses also sometimes argue they do not receive any benefits from
states where they are not physically present.174 But this argument seems to break
down quickly. Businesses obtain benefits from access to (i) common carriers and the
U.S. postal service located in the states used to make deliveries and returns; (ii) roads
used by common carries and the U.S. Postal Service; (iii) court systems to litigate
customer disputes or collect on delinquent accounts; (iv) trash services where
customers throw away catalogs and mailers; and (v) Internet infrastructure.175
ii.

States Attempts to Combat Revenue Losses

As discussed in Part II, Quill has resulted in revenue losses to the states.
Because of the revenue losses, states began crafting ways to impose use tax
collection responsibilities on remote sellers within the boundaries of Quill.176
One example is implementation by some states of what is commonly called
“click-through” nexus.177 These statues/regulations are also sometimes called
173. See Sales and Use Tax, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/products/sales-and-use-tax/ (last
visited Apr. 23, 2018). Some federal bills in the past have included provisions that would give certain
small businesses (those at certain defined thresholds) free compliance software. See Patrick Clark, The
Internet Sales Tax Is Back—Without Small Business Exemptions, BNA BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2013),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-19/the-internet-sales-tax-is-back-without-smallbusiness-exemptions;
see
also
Marketplace
Fairness
Act
2015,
AVALARA,
https://www.avalara.com/learn/whitepapers/marketplace-fairness-act/ (noting certain versions of federal
legislation have also included exemptions for small businesses, such as a version of the 2015 Marketplace
Fairness Act bill, which contained an exemption for sellers having gross annual receipts from sales in the
preceding calendar year of $1,000,000 or less) (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
174. See, e.g., Mazerov, supra note 84.
175. See, e.g., Mazerov, supra note 84; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 (1992)
(concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice White stated: “Nevertheless, an out-of-state direct
marketer derives numerous commercial benefits from the State in which it does business. These
advantages include laws establishing sound local banking institutions to support credit transactions; courts
to ensure collection of the purchase price from the seller’s customers; means of waste disposal from
garbage generated by mail-order solicitations; and creation and enforcement of consumer protection laws,
which protect buyers and sellers alike, the former by ensuring that they will have a ready means of
protecting against fraud, and the latter by creating a climate of consumer confidence that inures to the
benefit of reputable dealers in mail-order transactions.”).
176. See infra notes 177–193 and accompanying text; see also Mark P. Rotatori et al., The Past and
Uncertain Future of “Quill” and the Physical Presence Standard, BLOOMBERG BNA, WEEKLY STATE
TAX REPORT (2015).
177. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 44–54; see also ‘Economic Presence’ Enough for Sales Tax?
Relying on Quill May Be Hazardous, TAX EXECUTIVE (Aug. 24, 2016), http://taxexecutive.org/economicpresence-enough-for-sales-tax-relying-on-quill-may-be-hazardous/ (“Companies have also seen states
engaging in various nexus-expansion approaches, such as so-called click-through nexus. This kind of law,
pioneered by New York State, asserts nexus over a company that enters into an agreement with state
residents to post links to the company’s products on their websites in exchange for compensation.”);
Rebecca Helmes, Sales and Use Tax on Remote Sales: Do Varied State Approaches Warrant Federal
Action, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 9, 2014), https://www.bna.com/sales-tax-remote-n17179890310/
(“States have been cobbling together their own approaches for capturing sales and use tax from remote
sellers since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Quill Corp. v. North Dakota case, creating inconsistent
and uncertain tax collection obligations for multistate businesses. That is once again on display this year
in Bloomberg BNA’s annual Survey of State Tax Departments. Click-through nexus is one example.”);
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“Amazon laws.”178 The purpose is to impose physical presence on remote sellers by
way of attributing the physical presence of an in-state representative.179 The notable
case involving click-through nexus is the New York case involving both
Amazon.com and Overstock.com.180 At issue was the “Affiliates Program” both
companies used where third parties placed links on their websites and then when
customers clicked on those links it sent the customers to Amazon’s and Overstock’s
websites from where the customers then completed their purchases.181 The in-state
representatives participating in the Affiliates Programs received commissions based
on the percentage of revenues generated from customers “clicking through” the instate website links.182
To cause Amazon and Overstock (and other similar companies) to have
nexus in New York for sales and use tax collection purposes, a law was enacted
where this activity was deemed to constitute physical presence:
[A] person making sales of tangible personal property or services
taxable under this article (‘seller’) shall be presumed to be
soliciting business through an independent contractor or other
representative if the seller enters into an agreement with a resident
of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other
consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers,
whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller,
if the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to
customers in the state who are referred to the seller by all residents
with this type of an agreement with the seller is in excess of ten
thousand dollars during the preceding four quarterly periods.183
Amazon and Overstock brought suit alleging the statute was
unconstitutional citing Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns.184 They
ultimately lost.185 They petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, but the writ of certiorari

Stephen P. Kranz, et al., Is Quill Dead? At Least One State Has Written the Obituary, STATE TAX NOTES
(Aug. 2, 2010); Jennifer McLoughlin, E-Retailers, Congress Feel Heat From States’ Digital Tax Frenzy,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 9, 2016), https://www.bna.com/eretailers-congress-feel-n57982076514/.
178. See Erika Lunder & Carol Pettit, “Amazon Laws” and Taxation of Internet Sales: Constitutional
Analysis, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Nov. 28, 2014) (“In recent years, some states have
enacted laws, often called ‘Amazon laws’ in reference to the Internet retailer, to try to capture uncollected
taxes on Internet sales and yet still comply with the Constitution’s requirements. States have used two
basic approaches. The first is enacting ‘click-through nexus’ statutes which imposes the responsibility for
collecting tax on those retailers who compensate state residents for placing links on their websites to the
retailer’s website (i.e., use online referrals).”).
179. See, e.g., Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (Mar. 28,
2013).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 591.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 591–92.
184. Id. at 593.
185. Id. at 597.
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was denied in 2013.186 It is estimated that 20 states have click-through nexus laws
(as of January 2016).187
Another example of a state not sitting idly by in the wake of Quill is
Colorado.188 In 2010, Colorado enacted “information reporting” laws requiring
remote sellers to file certain information with the Colorado Department of Revenue,
including the names of customers who made purchases where sales and use taxes
were not collected and the amount of such purchases.189 In effect, Colorado
acknowledged that it could not require remote sellers to collect use taxes due to Quill,
so it did what it thought was the next best thing of requiring remote sellers to provide
the necessary information to the Department of Revenue so they had the information
to directly assess the purchasers for unpaid use taxes.190 The Direct Marketing
Association (“DMA”), a trade association, brought suit asserting the information
reporting requirement was unconstitutional.191 DMA ultimately lost and petitioned
the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.192 The writ of certiorari was denied on
December 12, 2016.193
Most recently, states have become more brazen by enacting what are
commonly called “economic presence” laws related to use tax collection.194 These
laws go squarely against Quill by imposing a use tax collection responsibility on
remote sellers based on the amount of sales or revenues generated in the state rather
than physical presence.195 The end goal being to cause the U.S. Supreme Court to
revisit Quill.196 Indeed, Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in the DMA
Marketing case (discussed above), expressly suggested Quill’s physical presence
standard needed to be revisited, noting that the holding in Quill was “tenuous” and
has led to “extreme harm and unfairness on the States.”197

186. See Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/amazon-com-llc-v-new-york-state-department-of-taxationand-finance/ (noting that petition for certiorari was denied on Dec. 2, 2013) (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
187. See, e.g., Scott Peterson, A Guide to Click-through Sales Tax Nexus for Small Businesses,
AVALARA BLOG (June 30, 2016), https://www.avalara.com/blog/2016/06/30/a-guide-to-click-throughsales-tax-nexus-for-small-businesses/.
188. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 18.
189. See, e.g., Sally Schreiber, Colorado’s Use Tax Notice and Reporting Law is Constitutional, Tenth
Circuit Holds, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/
2016/feb/colorado-amazon-law-is-constitutional-201613940.html.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Tripp Baltz, Hazy Outlook for High Court Probe of DMA Appeal: Sources, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.bna.com/hazy-outlook-high-n7301444714/.
193. See Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/direct-marketing-association-v-brohl-2/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018). In a cross petition,
Colorado asked the Supreme Court, in the event they took the case, to use it as a vehicle to address Quill
again. See, e.g., Vidya Kauri, Supreme Court Declines Colo. Sales Tax Reporting Row, LAW 360 (Dec.
12, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/871435.
194. See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
195. See discussion supra Part III.
196. See, e.g., Zachary T. Gladney & Rachel D. Trickett, Are Alabama, South Dakota Overeager to
Challenge Quill?, LAW 360 (May 23, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/798913.
197. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015), rev’g 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013);
see also generally Hamilton, supra note 18 (“For the states, the door to ‘killing Quill’ was opened—at
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Alabama led the economic presence movement with implementation of Ala.
Admin. Rule No. 810-6-2-.90.03.198 Alabama’s economic nexus standard is currently
in litigation.199 However, South Dakota has now steamrolled ahead of Alabama and
all other states pursuing economic nexus laws and regulations. On January 12, 2018,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari to hear South
Dakota’s case, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc, and oral arguments were held on April
17, 2018.200
least a crack—in 2015 by Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in Direct Marketing Association
v. Brohl, which challenged Colorado’s 2010 law that requires out-of-state sellers that don’t collect sales
and use tax on sales made into the state to provide notices to purchasers and report information about
those sales to the state Department of Revenue. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the
majority opinion in the case, which favored the state. He also made what he called a ‘separate statement
concerning what may well be a serious, continuing injustice faced by Colorado and many other States.’
In this statement, he encouraged the states to bring a challenge to Quill, noting how much electronic
commerce had evolved since Quill was decided in 1992. He referred to Quill as ‘[a] case questionable
even when decided.’ States quickly took up the invitation, first with Alabama’s challenge made by rule
change in 2015, followed by South Dakota’s ‘economic nexus’ law in 2016.”); Rebecca Newton-Clarke,
‘Economic Presence” Enough for Sales Tax? Relying on Quill May Be Hazardous, TAX EXECUTIVE (Aug.
24, 2016), http://taxexecutive.org/economic-presence-enough-for-sales-tax-relying-on-quill-may-behazardous/ (“Although the Supreme Court has consistently declined to revisit sales tax nexus since Quill,
at least one sitting justice has shown support for overturning the physical presence rule. Last year, Justice
Anthony Kennedy suggested in a concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl that the
Court should revisit its ‘questionable’ decision in Quill. He called the delay in doing so unwise and
suggested that extensive remote sales into a state might create ‘substantial nexus.’ His opinion was not
joined by other members of the Court, but it fanned the flames of a growing revolt among states that would
have enormous consequences for businesses.”).
198. Alabama’s regulation became effective January 1, 2016. See Christy Olinger Edwards & Joe
Garrett Jr., Alabama Accepts Invitation to Challenge Quill, 26 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES,
March/April 2016 at 8, 46. It has a de minimis threshold for sellers having $250,000 or less of sales of
tangible personal property in Alabama. See Jennifer McLoughlin, Many Companies Accepting States’
Growing Online Tax Reach, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 4, 2017). For more information on Alabama’s
economic presence regulation, see, e.g., Edwards & Garrett Jr., supra; Doug Sheppard, Tax Fight of the
Year: States’ War on Quill, TAX NOTES (Jan. 5, 2017); Eric Yauch, Alabama Gears Up for Court Battle
Over Controversial Sales Tax Regulation, TAX NOTES (May 10, 2016); Bruce P. Ely, The Challenge to
Alabama’s Economic Nexus Statute and Regulation—The Details and the Procedure, BLOOMBERG BNA
(July 22, 2016), https://www.bna.com/challenge-alabamas-economic-n73014445164/; Chris Marr,
Alabama Tax Fight With E-Retailers Begins Far From High Court, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 22, 2016);
Chris Marr, Online Sales Tax Case to Take Most of 2017 in Alabama, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.bna.com/online-sales-tax-n73014448728/; Jennifer McLoughlin, E-Retailers, Congress Feel
Heat From States’ Digital Tax Frenzy, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 8, 2016), https://www.bna.com/eretailerscongress-feel-n57982076514/ (“Alabama, which took the lead by adopting its regulation months after
Kennedy’s concurrence, received its long-awaited lawsuit when online retailer Newegg, Inc. brought the
first challenge in June. . . .”); Jennifer McLoughlin, E-Retailers, South Dakota Agree: Strike Digital Sales
Tax, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.bna.com/eretailers-south-dakota-n73014446403/
(“South Dakota and Alabama have led the charge against Quill, enacting economic nexus standards that
disregard the physical presence rule. Those efforts heeded the call from Justice Anthony Kennedy, who
suggested in a March 2015 concurring opinion that Quill may be outdated and ripe for the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reconsideration. . . .”); Eric Yauch, Getting to Quill: The Path to Overturning an Outdated
Supreme Court Decision, TAX ANALYSTS (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/newsanalysis-getting-quill-path-overturning-outdated-supreme-court-decision.
199. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
200. South Dakota, Petitioner v. Wayfair, Inc., et al., U.S. SUPREME COURT, https://www.
supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-494.html (last visited May
3, 2018).
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In addition to the above state efforts, at various times Congress has
attempted to overturn Quill with federal legislation.201 In fact, legislation to overturn
Quill has been pending in Congress more or less continuously since the case was
decided.202 Federal legislative attempts to overturn Quill have been unsuccessful so
far.203
V.

WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE WINE INDUSTRY?

There are many reasons why Quill’s physical presence standard for use tax
collection should be abandoned.204 There have been many excellent articles written
on this subject.205 Taking a related but different focus, the concentration of this article
is looking to the wine industry. More specifically, this article makes several
observations about what we can learn from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Granholm v. Heald and the aftereffects, which helps provide further support for an
abandonment of Quill.
Some background about the wine industry and Granholm is presented first
as it is helpful in understanding the conclusions reached in this article.
As discussed in Part II, sales and use taxes are paid by the end-user
consumer and collected by the retailer if the retailer has sufficient nexus in the state
where the item is sold. As wine is an item of tangible personal property, sales and
use taxes are imposed on the retail purchase of wine.206 Thus, if the seller has nexus
for sales and use tax collection purposes in the subject state, then the seller collects

201. See, e.g., Thomas Godfrey, Remote Seller Sales & Use Tax Collection: Online Sales;
Marketplace Fairness; Act Now, BLOOMBERG BNA WEEKLY STATE TAX REPORT (Mar. 27, 2015),
https://www.bna.com/uploadedFiles/BNA_V2/PDF/2015/Godfrey_perspective.pdf; Andrew J. Haile et
al., A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce Taxation, TAX ANALYSTS (Mar. 11, 2013),
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3436&context=facpub;
Jennifer
McLoughlin, E-Retailers, Congress Feel Heat From States’ Digital Tax Frenzy, BLOOMBERG BNA (July
5, 2016), https://www.bna.com/eretailers-congress-feel-n57982076514/ (“For almost 15 years, Congress
has toyed with the concept of one nexus standard governing all states, but various proposals either stalled
or never materialized into a formally introduced design.”).
202. See, e.g., Terry Ryan & Eric J. Miethke, A ‘Radical’ Solution to the Internet Sales Tax Problem,
TAX NOTES (July 29, 2014) (stating “[s]hortly after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Quill in 1992,
Congress introduced legislation to overturn it. In fact, legislation has been pending in Congress almost
continuously since then Sen. Dale Bumpers introduced his Tax Fairness for Main Street Business Act in
1994”).
203. For information on bills introduced in 2017, see, e.g., Paige Jones, Remote Sales Tax Bills
Reintroduced in Congress, TAX NOTES (Apr. 28, 2017) (“Federal bills on state remote sales taxation were
reintroduced April 27, kicking off this year’s congressional efforts on the topic.”). For information
regarding bills introduced in 2016, see, e.g., Jennifer McLoughlin, A Primer: The Congressional Battle
Over Digital Sales Tax, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.bna.com/primer-congressionalbattle-n57982077192/. For general information on federal legislative efforts to overturn Quill, see, e.g.,
Scott T. Allen, Adapting to the Internet: Why Legislation is Needed to Address the Preference for Online
Sales that Deprives States of Tax Revenue, 66 TAX LAW 939 (2013).
204. See discussion supra Part IV.
205. See supra note 18 (listing examples of articles written on subject).
206. See discussion supra Part I. Notably, there are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Wine Compliance
Rules, WINE INSTITUTE, https://wineinstitute.compliancerules.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
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the taxes from the end-user customer and remits them to the state revenue
department.207
States also impose excise taxes on wine.208 Excise tax rates are typically a
percentage imposed on the volume of wine sold to the retailer.209 Rates vary amongst
the states.210 Excise taxes are typically paid by the distributor.211 The distributor also
remits the taxes and files state excise tax returns with the state revenue
departments.212 The “distributor,” along with the “manufacturer” and “retailer” are
the parties in the wine industry making up what is commonly called the “3-tier
system” of alcohol distribution.213
The 3-tier system dates back to the end of Prohibition.214 The repeal of
Prohibition occurred in 1933 with the passage of the 21st Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.215 Section 1 of the 21st Amendment repealed Prohibition while Section
2 gave the states power to regulate their alcohol markets (to the point of forbidding
the sale of alcohol and remaining dry if they so desired).216 Sections 1 and 2 of the
21st Amendment provide:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any state,
territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited. . . . 217
Not surprisingly, with the end of Prohibition, states began to exercise their
right to regulate alcohol.218 There are two categories of state regulation: (i) control

207. See discussion supra Parts I & II.
208. See, e.g., Richard Mendelson, WINE IN AMERICA 366 (2011); Scott Drenkard, How High Are
Wine Taxes in Your State (2016), TAX FOUND. (June 7, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/how-high-arewine-taxes-your-state-2016/; State Tax Rates on Wine, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/Rates/wine.pdf. Federal excise taxes are also imposed.
See, e.g., Mendelson, supra, at 23–29, 160–61. A discussion of federal excise taxes is beyond the scope
of this article.
209. See, e.g., State Tax Rates on Wine, supra note 208.
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., Filing Requirements for Registered Distributors of Alcoholic Beverages, N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FIN. (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pubs_and_bulls/tg_bulletins/
abt/filing_requirements_for_registered_distributors.htm.
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 15–19, 29, 206–07; Madeline Puckette, What’s The
Three Tier System and Why is It Corroding?, WINE FOLLY (Aug. 29, 2014), http://winefolly.com/
update/three-tier-system/.
214. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 13–19.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 195.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1–2.
218. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 195.
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states, and (ii) open license states.219 In control states, the state government controls
the sale of alcohol through government agencies at the distributor and/or retail
level.220 Most states, though, operate as open license states where they maintain
licensing systems for private businesses to engage in the sale and distribution of
alcohol through the 3-tier system.221
The 3-tier system separates manufacturers, distributors, and retailers into
distinct and independent tiers, where a licensee of one tier generally cannot be a
licensee of another tier.222 Tier 1 comprises manufacturers, which includes wineries,
as well as breweries and distilleries.223 Under the 3-tier system, manufacturers are
allowed to sell their products only to the Tier 2 distributors, also sometimes referred
to as wholesalers.224 The Tier 2 distributors are then allowed to sell only to retailers,
which includes restaurants, taverns, bars, and retail market stores, such as Spec’s®
and Total Wine & More®.225 The Tier 3 retailers are the only tier within the 3-Tier
system allowed to make sales to end-user consumers.226 The diagram below shows
how the 3-tier system works:

219. See id. at 15–17; Billy Hamilton, State Liquor Taxes: Still Crazy After All These Years, TAX
NOTES (Mar. 3, 2015).
220. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 17.
221. See, e.g., id. at 15; Hamilton, supra note 219.
222. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 206–07; NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N,
THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM: A MODERN VIEW 1–5 (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/
20170815204443/http://ali.state.al.us/documents/1Three-TierSystemModernView.pdf (noting that the
specifics of the licensing regimes in each of the open states vary); Hamilton, supra note 219 (noting that
under the 3-tier system “[e]verybody had a piece of the pie, but nobody got more than one piece.”).
223. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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Those who support the 3-tier system argue that it ensures the efficient
payment of excise taxes and prevents alcohol from getting into the hands of underage
individuals.227 There has been much debate about the pros and cons of the 3-tier
system.228 Some describe it as necessary for the reasons outlined above, as well as
other reasons, including the argument that it helps secure market access for
manufacturers.229 Others, however, describe the 3-tier system as inefficient,
unnecessary, and existing only to protect the profits of distributors.230
While a full discussion of the pros and cons on the 3-tier system is beyond
the scope of this article, one significant disadvantage of the system relevant to this
article is that it did not accommodate consumers who wanted to purchase wine
directly from a winery (i.e., the manufacturer).231 Consider this:
Fact Pattern: You are from Texas and you visit a winery in Napa
Valley, California. You take a tour and enjoy a wine tasting.
Before you leave, you would like to purchase a bottle of wine to
take back home with you to Texas.
It is this and similar fact patterns that caused many states in the 1970s to
craft exceptions to the 3-tier system whereby wineries (i.e., the manufacturers)
became allowed to sell wine directly to consumers, but only to consumers who
visited their wineries.232
Fast forward to the Internet age and you likely already can see what
happened: consumers wanted to buy wine directly from winery websites.233 And not
surprisingly, wineries wanted to fulfill this demand.234 Especially small wineries that
needed to depend on online sales as part of their business model.235

227. See, e.g., NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, supra note 222.
228. See, e.g., When Wine Enters, Sense Leaves: A Case for Why the Three-Tier System’s Regulations
Stir Competition, Boost Diversity, and Protect Consumers, CTR. FOR ALCOHOL POLICY,
http://www.centerforalcoholpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Gurney-Pearsall-Essay.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 23, 2018) [hereinafter When Wine Enters, Sense Leaves]; What’s The Three Tier System and
Why is It Corroding?, WINE FOLLY (Aug. 29, 2014), http://winefolly.com/update/three-tier-system/.
229. See, e.g., When Wine Enters, Sense Leaves, supra note 228; What’s The Three Tier System and
Why is It Corroding?, supra note 228.
230. See, e.g., When Wine Enters, Sense Leaves, supra note 228; What’s The Three Tier System and
Why is It Corroding?, supra note 228.
231. See supra notes 222–226 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 207.
233. See, e.g., Gregory A. Castanias, The Supreme Court’s Granholm v. Heald Decision: What it
Means for Interstate Wine Shipping (June 2005), http://www.jonesday.com/the-supreme-courtsigranholm-v-healdi-decision--what-it-means-for-interstate-wine-shipping-06-16-2005/.
234. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 207.
235. See, e.g., William C. Green, Creating a Common Market for Wine: Boutique Wines, Direct
Shipment, and State Alcohol Regulation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 14 (2012) (“The American wine
industry has changed substantially with the establishment of several thousand boutique wineries. These
small wineries found it difficult to sell their limited production to customers in other states, in spite of the
access provided by the Internet and package delivery services, because state governments were unwilling
to permit out-of-state wineries to ship directly to consumers. In response, these boutique wineries, their
producer associations, and customers sued states in federal court.”).
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Some states began allowing wineries to ship directly to consumers, even
though it seemingly eroded the traditional 3-tier system.236 But the rules put in place
by the states oftentimes discriminated against out-of-state wineries as compared to
in-state wineries.237 Richard Mendelson, an internationally-recognized expert on
vineyard and wine law, described the situation like this in his book WINE IN
AMERICA:
By 2003, 30 states permitted winery direct-to-consumer shipments
within the state. Of this number 24 states also allowed some form
of direct interstate shipping. Thirteen of these 24 passed
“reciprocity” laws that granted out-of-state wineries the right to
ship a certain amount of wine per month to an in-state consumer
on the express condition that the winery’s home state must afford
wineries in the destination state a similar direct-to consumer
privilege. Some of the remaining 11 states allowed direct shipping
by out-of-state wineries, but placed restrictions on their interstate
shipments that were not imposed on intrastate shipments. Still,
approximately half the states allowed no direct interstate
shipments at all, and some of these states made it a felony for outof-state wineries to ship wine to in-state consumers.238
As to the restrictions placed on interstate shipments that were not imposed
on intrastate shipments, Mendelson further points out: “[t]he states made these
decisions under the authority of the Twenty-first Amendment, presumably without
considering the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause.”239 Stated
differently, states took the position they could discriminate against interstate
commerce because they believed the 21st Amendment’s grant to them of the power
to regulate alcohol trumped the Commerce Clause.240
This situation set the stage for the U.S. Supreme Court case Granholm v.
Heald.241 Granholm was a consolidated case involving state laws in Michigan and
New York that allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers in the state
but not out-of-state wineries.242 The discriminatory treatment was easy to spot with
the Michigan law.243 The Michigan law gave in-state wineries the ability to ship
directly to consumers as long as the winery obtained a license and adhered to certain
requirements, but out-of-state wineries were not afforded this opportunity.244 The
differential treatment led to increased prices to Michigan consumers wanting to
purchase the out-of-state wines, and in some cases even led to small wineries being

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 206–15.
See id., at 207–08.
Id.
Id. at 208.
See infra notes 236–239 and accompanying text; see also infra note 252 and accompanying text.
544 U.S. 460 (2005).
Id. at 465–66; see also, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 208, at 209.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473.
Id.
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barred from entering the Michigan market because wholesalers would choose not to
contract with small wineries.245
New York’s law was different. It did not ban direct shipments by out-ofstate wineries altogether.246 Instead, out-of-state wineries could obtain a license to
acquire direct shipping privileges (just like an in-state winery), but only if the outof-state winery established a physical presence in New York by forming a branch
office or warehouse in the state.247 The “physical presence” requirement effectively
created a system where in-state wineries had direct-shipping access to New York
consumers on a preferential basis.248 The Court was keen to point out that the cost of
requiring an out-of-state winery to open up a branch office or warehouse in New
York led to the result where “not a single out-of-state winery has availed itself of
New York’s direct shipping privilege.”249
The Court had no problem concluding that the direct shipping laws in both
Michigan and New York discriminated against interstate commerce.250 At the heart
of the case was Michigan and New York’s argument that they were allowed to
engage in the discrimination because of Section 2 of the 21st Amendment.251 In
effect, Michigan and New York argued that Section 2 of the 21st Amendment
trumped the Commerce Clause and allowed states to discriminate against out-of-state
wineries.252
After a lengthy discussion of history both before and after Prohibition, the
history of the 18th and 21st Amendments, the Wilson Act, the Webb-Kenyon Act,
and applicable cases, the Court ultimately concluded that “the Twenty-first
Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in
particular, does not displace the rule that States may not give discriminatory
preference to their own producers.”253
In reaching its decision, though, the Court also had to consider whether the
Michigan or New York law “advance[d] a legitimate local purpose that [could not]
be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”254 New York
and Michigan argued such was the case under two theories: (1) keeping alcohol away
from underage individuals; and (2) tax collection.255 The States did not prevail on
either theory.256
The tax collection issue is relevant to this article. New York and Michigan
argued (unsuccessfully) that their laws were necessary because without them there
would be lost revenue from unpaid taxes.257 Somewhat interestingly, at first glance,
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 473–74.
Id. at 470–71, 474–76.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 474–75.
See id. at 476.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
Id.
Id. at 492–93.
Id. at 491.
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it a bit difficult to tell whether the Court’s opinion addresses the tax collection issue
only with respect to excise taxes or with respect to both excise taxes and the
collection of use taxes.258 The relevant part of the Court’s opinion states:
The States’ tax collection justification is also insufficient.
Increased direct shipping, whether originating in state or out of
state, brings with it the potential for tax evasion. With regard to
Michigan, however, the tax-collection argument is a diversion.
This is because Michigan, unlike many other States, does not rely
on wholesalers to collect taxes on wines imported from out-ofstate. Instead, Michigan collects taxes directly from out-of-state
wineries on all wine shipped to in-state wholesalers. Mich. Admin.
Code Rule 436.1725(2) (1989) (“Each outside seller of wine shall
submit . . . a wine tax report of all wine sold, delivered, or
imported into tis state during the preceding calendar month”). If
licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine
distributed through the three-tier system, there is no reason to
believe they will not suffice for direct shipments.
New York and its supporting parties also advance a tax-collection
justification for the State’s direct-shipment laws. While their
concerns are not wholly illusory, their regulatory objectives can be
achieved without discriminating against interstate commerce. In
particular, New York could protect itself against lost tax revenue
by requiring a permit as a condition of direct shipping. This is the
approach taken by New York for in-state wineries. The State offers
no reason to believe the system would prove ineffective for outof-state wineries. Licensees could be required to submit regular
sales reports and to remit taxes. Indeed, various States use this
approach for taxing direct interstate wine shipments, e.g., N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 178.27 (Lexis Supp. 2004), and report no problems
with tax collection. See FTC Report 38-40. This is also the
procedure sanctioned by the National Conference of State
Legislatures in their Model Direct Shipping Bill. See, e.g., S. C.
Code Ann. 61-4-747(C) (West Supp. 2004).259
Focusing first on the discussion of Michigan in the first paragraph above,
Mich. Admin Code Rule 436.1725(2) is a rule related solely to excise taxes.
However, in the second paragraph above, the Court’s reference to the FTC Report
and the Model Direct Shipping Bill relates to both excise taxes and the collection of
sales and use taxes. Furthermore, the party’s briefs on the tax collection issue
discussed both excise taxes and the collection of sales and use taxes.260 Thus, it seems
258. See infra notes 259–261 and accompanying text.
259. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491–92.
260. See Brief for Private Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub
nom. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 03-1274), 2004 WL 2138121; Brief for WineAmerica
et al., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (Nos. 03-116, 03-1120), 2004 WL 2190369; Brief for
State of New York Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 03-1274), 2004 WL 2190371; Brief of Amici Curiae States
of California et al., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 03-1274), 2004 WL 2190375; Brief of
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clear the Court’s decision on this issue related to both excise taxes and the collection
of sales and use taxes.261
With this in mind, the remaining focus of this article is looking to what can
be observed from Granholm and the aftereffects of the decision that can be used to
provide additional support for overturning Quill. This discussion is broken out into
five subparts below.
i.

Granholm Allows Tax Collection Despite No Physical Presence

The first observation is that the Granholm decision allows states to impose
a use tax collection responsibility on out-of-state wineries despite such wineries not
having a physical presence in the state.262 Recall that under Quill an out-of-state
company without physical presence in the state(s) to which it is shipping is not
required to collect use taxes.263 However, the Court in Granholm did not impose this
same physical presence requirement, and instead allowed states to impose a use tax
collection responsibility on out-of-state wineries in conjunction with obtaining the
necessary permit to gain direct-shipping access.264
Consider the National Conference of State Legislature’s Model Direct
Shipping Act, which provides in relevant part:
All Wine Direct Shipper Licensees shall:
...
(e) If located outside of this state, annually pay to the [State
Revenue Agency] all sales taxes and excise taxes due on sales to
residents of [State] in the preceding calendar year, the amount of
such taxes to be calculated as if the sale were in [State]. . . .265
In implementing Granholm, states have adopted language similar to the
Model Act’s language requiring out-of-state wineries to obtain a sales tax permit in
order to receive a direct shipping permit.266 By way of example, three of the largest

Ohio and 32 Other States Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)
(No. 03-116), 2004 WL 1743941; Reply Brief for New York State Defendants-Appellants, Swedenburg
v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 46 (2005) (No. 029511(L), 03-7089), 2003 WL 2417435; Brief and Special Appendix for Intervenor-DefendantsAppellants, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 46 (2005) (No. 02-9511(L), 03-7089), 2003 WL 24174355; Brief for New York State DefendantsAppellants, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 46 (2005) (No. 02-9511(L), 03-7089), 2003 WL 24174356; Final Brief of Defendants-Appellees,
Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (2003) aff’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 012720), 2002 WL 34200813.
261. See supra notes 258–260 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 241–250.
263. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 296 (1992).
264. See supra note 259.
265. Model Direct Shipping Bill, FREE THE GRAPES, http://freethegrapes.org/model-direct-shippingbill (last visited, Mar. 9, 2018).
266. See infra notes 267–282 and accompanying text.
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direct shipment states (California, Texas, and New York)267 require this.268 The
relevant parts of the direct shipping permit applications for these states are set forth
below.
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Wine
Direct Shipper Permit Application
(b) A wine direct shipper permit authorizes the permitholder to do
all of the following:
...
(5) If the permitholder is located outside of this state, pay to the
State Board of Equalization all sales and use taxes, and excise
taxes on sales to residents of California under the wine direct
shipper permit. . . .269
Texas Form L-DS-I, Out-of-State Winery Direct Shipper’s Permit
This permit may only be issued to a person who:
267. See SOVOS SHIPCOMPLIANT, 2017 DIRECT TO CONSUMER WINE SHIPPING REPORT 22 (2017),
http://go.sovos.com/rs/485-CPP-341/images/DtC_17_012516_web.pdf.
268. See infra notes 269–274 and accompanying text; see also Getting REAL about DtC Shipping:
Issues Wineries Need to Consider, SHIPCOMPLIANT, http://go.sovos.com/GettingRealaboutDtCShipping
-OnDemandVideo.html?aliId=43204372 (indicating that most states usually require wineries to register
for sales/use tax collection and excise taxes in order to obtain an out-of-state winery direct shipping
permit). However, a handful of states do not require sales/use tax collection or payment of excise taxes.
See id. For example, the District of Columbia does not require a permit for direct shipping, and by
extension does not require tax registrations for sales/use tax collection or the payment of excise taxes. See
id. Another example is Florida, which does not require a permit for direct shipping but does require the
out-of-state winery pay excise taxes. See id. With respect to sales/use tax collection, Florida gives the
winery the option to collect or include information in the shipment that details the purchaser’s
responsibility to directly remit sales/use taxes. See id. Another example is Massachusetts, which requires
out-of-state wineries to pay excise taxes but does not require use tax collection. See New Direct Wine
Shipper License Applications Now Available for Massachusetts, SHIPCOMPLIANT, (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.shipcompliant.com/blog/2014/11/24/new-direct-shipper-permit-applications
-now-available-massachusetts/.
269. Wine Direct Shipper Permit Application, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
CONTROL, http://www.abc.ca.gov/forms/ABC248.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2018). California is somewhat
unique to the other direct shipping states because a larger amount of direct shipment of sales occur inside
California as compared to other states. See id. The significance is that these inside-state sales would not
be relevant to the issues discussed in this article. California continues to be relevant, though, because it
still has a large amount of winery direct sales being shipped outside of California. A statistic related to
Napa Valley shows that only 32% of direct-to-consumer winery sales go to California residents. See, e.g.,
Wine
Industry
Metrics,
WINES
&
VINES
(June
15,
2017),
https://www.winesandvines.com/template.cfm?section=widc&widcDomain=dtc&widcYYYYMM=201
705. However, another statistic related to California direct-to-consumer shipping indicates that 96% of
California’s direct-to-consumer sales are from California wineries. See SOVOS SHIPCOMPLIANT, 2016
DIRECT TO CONSUMER WINE SHIPPING REPORT 22 (2016), https://www.shipcompliant.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/2016-DtC-Report.pdf. But for other typical wine producing states, the figures
are lower. For example, in Oregon, only 61% of Oregon residents received their direct shipments from
Oregon wineries. Id. For Washington State residents, only 47% received their direct shipments from
Washington State wineries. Id.
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Does not hold a winery permit in the State of Texas;
Operates a winery located in the United States and holds
all state and federal permits necessary to operate the
winery at the permitted location, including the federal
winemaker’s and blender’s basic permit;
Holds a Texas Sales Tax Permit;
Expressly submits to personal jurisdiction in Texas state
and federal courts and expressly submits to venue in
Travis County, Texas, as proper venue for any
proceeding that may be initiated by or against the
commission; and
Does not directly or indirectly have any financial interest
in a Texas wholesaler or retailer as those terms are used
in Section 102.01 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code.270

New York Application for a New York Out-of-State Direct
Shipper’s License, ABC Law § 79-2, 3 Year License
THE APPLICANT VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTS THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
ISSUANCE OF AN OUT-OF-STATE DIRECT SHIPPER’S
LICENSE, AND AS AN APPLICANT AND LICENSEE WILL
ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
...
6. The Licensee will file returns with and pay to the New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance all State and local sales
taxes and excise taxes due on sales into New York State in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the New York State
Tax Law relating to such taxes, the amount of such taxes to be
determined n [sic] the basis that each sale in this State was at the
location where delivery is made.”271
Similarly, Pennsylvania, which is one of the most recent states to grant
direct shipping privileges to out-of-state wineries (and one of the largest wine
markets in the United States),272 also requires out-of-state wineries to obtain a sales

270. Information and Instructions for Out-of-State Winery Direct Shipper’s Permit, TEXAS
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, http://www.tabc.state.tx.us/forms/licensing/out-of-StateWinery
Shippers.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
271. Application for a New York State Out-of-State Direct Shipper’s License, STATE OF NEW YORK
LIQUOR AUTHORITY, https://www.sla.ny.gov/system/files/Direct-Shipper-040813.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2018).
272. See Pennsylvania Legalizes Winery Direct Shipping, Grocery Store Wine Sales, WINE
SPECTATOR, http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/Pennsylvania-Legalizes-Winery-Direct
-Shipping (last visited Mar. 10, 2018); see SOVOS SHIPCOMPLIANT, supra note269, at 5, 29 (stating that
Pennsylvania began issuing permits in August 2016 and wineries “had shipped more than 59,000 cases of
wine with a value of $21.7 million by the end of the year.”).
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tax permit in order to acquire a direct-shipping permit.273 The relevant part of
Pennsylvania’s direct shipping permit application in the FAQ section provides:
Applicants must file on line through PLCB+, pay a $250 fee,
provide a copy of the applicant’s current producer license, provide
documentation that the applicant has obtained a sales tax number
from the Department of Revenue, and provide other information
as required by the PLCB’s Bureau of Licensing.274
Some states have reconciled Granholm and Quill by requiring out-of-state
wineries to collect only the state portion of use taxes.275 Texas fits into this
category.276 The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts takes the position that the
out-of-state winery needs to have physical presence in Texas in order to also be
required to collect the local portion of use taxes due on the sale.277 In online
publication 94-179, the Texas Comptroller’s office explains this position as follows:
Out-of-state wineries must collect and remit state sales tax on sales
and deliveries to Texas. The current state sales and use tax rate is
6.25 percent.
An out-of-state winery must also collect local use tax if it ships to
a customer in a local taxing jurisdiction where the winery is
engaged in business. For purposes of the tax law, “engaged in
business” means that within the last 12 months the winery had a
physical contact or presence in the jurisdiction, such as sending
traveling salespersons or attending trade shows or similar events
to solicit or promote sales.
An out-of-state winery that is not engaged in business in any local
jurisdictions in Texas does not have to collect local use tax. The
winery can voluntarily collect use tax, however, as a convenience
to their customers who owe the tax based on the point of
delivery.278
Other states, however, have reconciled Granholm and Quill by requiring
out-of-state wineries to collect both state and local use taxes.279 New York is an

273. Frequently Asked Questions, PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BD., http://www.lcb.pa.gov
/Legal/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
274. Id.
275. See infra notes 276–278 and accompanying text.
276. See Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Tax Bulletin, Out-of-State Wineries and Texas Taxes, TEXAS
COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS (Nov. 2005) https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/laws/other/taxBulletin
Nov05.pdf. Arkansas also fits into this category. See Ark. Dep’t of Fin. and Admin. Ruling issued to Mr.
Stephen E. Morley (May 24, 2017) (on file with author). The Arkansas Department of Finance and
Administration issued a ruling in 2014 confirming out-of-state wineries were not required to collect local
use taxes. See id.
277. See Strayhorn, supra note 276.
278. Id.
279. See Application for a New York State Out-of-State Direct Shipper’s License, supra note 271;
Direct Wine Shipment Tax Bulletin 16-001, PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE (July 29, 2016), http://www.
revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/TaxLawPoliciesBulletinsNotices/Documents/Tax%20Bulletins/
Direct%20Wine%20Shipment/dws_bulletin_16-001.pdf.
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example.280 Pennsylvania is another example.281 The Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue stated in Direct Wine Shipment Tax Bulletin 16-001:
On June 8, 2016, Governor Tom Wolf signed into law Act 39 of
2016, amending the Liquor Code to provide for various consumer
convenience initiatives including direct shipment of wine from
out-of-state wine producers to residents of this commonwealth.
The amendments to the Liquor Code impose a $2.50 per gallon
excise tax on direct wine shipments. In addition, all direct wine
shipment sales are subject to Pennsylvania state and local sales
tax.282
Thus, states have taken different approaches to reconciling Granholm and
Quill.283 The less aggressive approach is to require out-of-state wineries to collect
only the state portion.284 From the winery’s perspective, it is difficult to see how the
collection of both state and local use taxes—but especially only the state portion—
would be administratively burdensome.285 In today’s age of the Internet and
software, it should not be difficult to determine the one and only rate for the state
portion of use taxes due on a sale. It also seems difficult to argue that determining
the local rates, as well as filing sales and use tax returns and remitting the taxes, is
burdensome.286 Especially considering the growing number of sales and use tax
software service providers, such as ShipCompliant (specifically for wineries and
others in the alcohol industry) and Avalara (for all businesses of all types).287
In fact, there does not appear to have been any reported backlash from outof-state wineries related to the imposition of the use tax collection responsibility.288
Instead, out-of-state wineries seem to have welcomed the requirement in exchange
for the ability to compete in a marketplace where they desired to be.289 That is, outof-state wineries simply viewed it as a cost of doing business in the direct-toconsumer market.290 This can be seen from statements made at a 2003 workshop on
direct-to-consumer wine shipping where the Wine Institute, a trade association for
wineries, commented that wineries “will embrace any kind of scheme that would
require payment of taxation if we can simply get access to the markets.”291
The significance is this: With the revisiting of Quill, the Supreme Court can
look to what has happened after Granholm as proof that imposing use tax collection

280. See Application for a New York State Out-of-State Direct Shipper’s License, supra note 271.
281. Direct Wine Shipment Tax Bulletin 16-001, supra note 279.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 276–282 and accompanying text.
284. See discussion supra Parts II & III.
285. See infra notes 286–291 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 171–173 and accompanying text; SHIPCOMPLIANT, https://www.shipcompliant
.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2018); AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
287. SHIPCOMPLIANT, supra note 286; AVALARA, supra note 286.
288. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE
38–39 (2003), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/105-cv-7356.pdf.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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responsibilities on remote sellers in today’s age of technology does not wreak havoc
on society.292 Congress could also look to this same phenomenon if federal
legislation to overturn Quill ever heats up again.293
It is important to note that there have been arguments advanced on both
sides concerning whether Granholm went further to undermine Quill.294 The
discussion above is not meant to suggest Granholm undermined Quill. Rather, it is
meant only to point out that Granholm allowed states to impose a use tax collection
requirement on out-of-state wineries in conjunction with obtaining an out-of-state
direct shipping permit, and out-of-state wineries appeared to simply view it as a cost
of doing business and not an administrative burden.295 The lack of administrative
burdens is discussed below in more detail.
ii.

Use Tax Collection Not Administratively Burdensome

The second observation continues to build on administrative burdens, or
what appears to be a lack thereof.296 Despite the Supreme Court finding in Bellas
Hess (upon which the Court continued to rely in Quill on starie decisis grounds) that
physical presence in the taxing state was necessary in order to alleviate
administrative burdens on out-of-state retailers,297 the Court in Granholm did not
articulate a similar finding.298 In fact, the majority in Granholm seemed to reach the
opposite conclusion.299 Recall that in Granholm the Court found that requiring outof-state wineries to obtain direct shipping permits, which in turn could require them
to collect use taxes, was an appropriate solution to the lost revenue argument of the
states.300 The Court seemed to see it this way: if tax collection works as to in-state
wineries, then why shouldn’t it work as to out-of-state wineries?301 The Court did
not even find it necessary to mention administrative burdens, thereby seeming to
suggest none existed.302 In effect, Granholm seems to suggest that the collection of
sales and use taxes (perhaps both the state and local portions, but at a minimum the
state portion) is not administratively burdensome.303 If the Court thought it was
administratively burdensome, then it does not seem that it could have made the

292. See FED. TRADE COMM’N supra note 288.
293. See id.
294. See WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 19.02[4] (3rd ed. 2001);
Walter Hellerstein & John A. Swain, Distinguishing Swill from Quill, STATE TAX TODAY (Aug. 8, 2005);
Brian L. Browdy, An Open Letter to the U.S. Supreme Court on Sales Taxes, Office Equipment, And MailOrder Hooch, STATE TAX TODAY (July 18, 2005).
295. See supra notes 262–293 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 285–291 and accompanying text.
297. See discussion supra Part III.
298. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 491–92.
301. See id. at 491 (“In particular, New York could protect itself against lost tax revenue by requiring
a permit as a condition of direct shipping. This is the approach taken by New York for in-state wineries.”).
302. Id. at 491–93.
303. See id.; see also supra notes 276–284 and accompanying text.
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determination that the use tax collection requirement was a reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternative to the statutes at issue in the case.304
Perhaps this, along with Justice Kennedy’s comments in DMA, are
indications that change is on the horizon in the Wayfair case.305 As discussed earlier,
Justice Gorsuch, while still sitting on the Tenth Circuit, commented as part of DMA
that Quill does not seem viable in today’s world.306
Another observation from Granholm further illustrating that use tax
collection is not administratively burdensome is that in addition to there being no
reported backlash on the issue of use tax collection, many of these direct-shipment
wineries are also small businesses (i.e., over 90% of U.S. wineries are small
businesses).307 And significant with respect to direct-shipment wineries is that the
use tax collection responsibility is in addition to the excise tax responsibility.308 This
observation concerning small wineries is significant because many who object to a
reversal of Quill are small businesses who argue use tax collection would be
administratively burdensome because they are small businesses.309
And again, perhaps the most notable observation concerns out-of-state
wineries having to comply with two state tax obligations, use tax collection and state
excise taxes.310 If out-of-state wineries can comply with two tax-related obligations
seemingly without issue, then that would seem to demonstrate that requiring other
out-of-state retailers to comply with only one tax-related obligation should not be
administratively burdensome.311
This is not to say that use tax collection does not involve costs, such as
acquiring necessary software, training employees to use the software, etc., and that
it is not as easy for small businesses to absorb theses costs as compared to large
304.
305.
306.
307.

See Granholm, 544 U.S. 460, at 491–93.
See Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134–35 (2015).
See Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (2016).
See Lexi Williams & Ben O’Donnell, New Report Shows Winery Direct Shipping Sales Surging,
WINE SPECTATOR (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/New-ReportShows-Winery-Direct-Shipping-Sales-Surging (stating “Roughly 90 percent of the new U.S. wineries fell
into the ‘limited production’ and ‘very small production’ categories.”); see, e.g., Brief for the Wine and
Spirits Wholesalers of America et al., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (Nos. 03-1116, 03-1120,
03-1274), 2004 WL 1743943; see also SOVOS SHIPCOMPLIANT, supra note 269, at 4 (indicating that in
2017, out of a total of 9,069 U.S. wineries: (i) 3,500 were categorized as limited production, which are
the smallest wineries producing less than 1,000 cases; (ii) 3,675 were categorized as very small wineries,
producing 1,000–4,999 cases; and (iii) 1,560 were categorized as small wineries, producing 5,000–49,999
cases). The remaining wineries were categorized as either medium or large. See id. 260 were categorized
as medium, producing 50,000–499,999 cases. See id. Sixty-four wineries were categorized as large,
producing more than 500,000 cases. See id.; see also Lexi Williams & Ben O’Donnell, New Report Shows
Winery Direct Shipping Sales Surging, WINE SPECTATOR, Jan. 31, 2017.
308. See supra notes 208–213 and accompanying text.
309. See George S. Isaacson & Matthew P. Schaefer, Retail Giants vs. Small Business: The Remote
Sales Tax Fight, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.brannlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/2017-02-27-GSI-MPS-Retail-Giants-v-Small-Business-The-Real-RemoteSales-Tax-Fight2.pdf.
310. See supra notes 208–213 and accompanying text.
311. Although not related to the wine industry, another recent occurrence further supporting the
conclusion that collecting use taxes is not administratively burdensome is South Carolina’s new economic
presence standard where it has been reported that some businesses are voluntarily complying with the use
tax collection requirement while the law is in litigation.
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businesses. But if the goal is to provide some amount of relief to small businesses,
this goes back to the question discussed in Part III: how does physical presence in a
state suddenly and magically make the administrative burden of these costs for small
businesses disappear?312 For example, if a small business located in New Mexico
close to the Texas border makes deliveries into Texas in company-owned trucks
rather than common carrier (thereby creating physical presence in Texas under the
Quill standard), how does this “physical presence” suddenly and magically make the
cost of use tax collection any more affordable or make the administrative burden
disappear as compared to if the company avoided physical presence by using a
common carrier to make the deliveries?313 Indeed , as the Court in Quill
acknowledged, the physical presence standard is “artificial at its edges.”314 A better
model to assist small businesses is not keeping Quill, but rather, creating exceptions
to use tax collection based on the amount of sales and/or revenues generated as was
done with the economic presence rules implemented in Alabama and South
Dakota.315
iii. Growing Number of States Allowing
Direct Shipping Post-Granholm
Another observation gleaned from the aftereffects of Granholm, further
related to demonstrating use tax collection is not administratively burdensome, is the
growing number of states post-Granholm now allowing out-of-state winery direct
shipping.316
As a result of Granholm, states had two choices: (1) allow the same direct
shipping privileges to both in-state and out-of-state wineries (what was commonly
called “level up”); or (2) do not allow direct shipping at all (what was commonly

312. See discussion supra Part III.
313. See, e.g., John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for
the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 34546 (2003) (“In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court
held that constitutionally sufficient nexus turns not on the level of in-state economic activity but on the
essentially arbitrary marker of whether a taxpayer is physically present in a state. Thus, according to the
Court imposing a use tax collection obligation on a remote mail order company making $10 million in
annual in-state sales would unduly burden interstate commerce, while asking the same favor of a low
volume seller with a single in-state sales representative would not. The Court acknowledged that the
physical presence test is ‘artificial at its edges.’ In truth, it is artificial ‘through and through.’”).
314. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
315. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. Perhaps thresholds as seen in Alabama and
South Carolina are not high enough. If this is proved to be the case, then the thresholds can be adjusted.
An analogous situation is Texas’ small business exemption from the Texas franchise tax. The revenue
threshold for what constitutes a small business for purposes of the exemption has been increased
throughout the years. See Swain, supra note 313, at 345 (“As between collecting tax from each individual
consumer or from the seller, it is more administratively practical to collect the tax from the seller. Thus,
anyone making taxable sales to consumers within the taxing jurisdiction should have a collection
obligation, subject to a de minimis threshold below which the cost of collection exceeds the benefit. It
does not take much thought to conclude that a de minimis threshold should be measured by the sales
volume or the percentage of its total business that a seller does in a jurisdiction, or both.”).
316. See Green, supra note 235, at 39; SOVOS SHIPCOMPLIANT, supra note 267
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called “level down”).317 At the time Granholm was decided only 3 states had laws
allowing direct shipping on equal terms as between in-state and out-of-state
wineries.318 As of 2016, 44 states have come to allow direct shipping by both in-state
and out-of-state wineries.319 The only states currently not allowing direct-toconsumer shipping are: Utah, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky,
Delaware, and Rhode Island.320
As previously outlined, most states that allow direct shipping also require
the out-of-state winery to comply with excise taxes as well as collect use taxes in
order to obtain a direct shipping permit.321 No doubt many factors went into a state
deciding to “level up” post-Granholm. But one factor would seem to be that states
do not perceive, and have not experienced, substantial compliance problems
associated with putting the use tax collection requirement on the out-of-state
wineries.322 If not posing a significant compliance problem, then logic would seem
to dictate a lack of administrative burdens. Indeed, South Dakota is already
experiencing voluntary compliance with its economic nexus law even while in
litigation, which may also indicate that compliance with use tax collection
requirements is not overly burdensome.323
iv. Large Number of Direct-Shipping Permits Issued
Another observation related to the wine industry and the aftereffects of
Granholm that can be applied in support of overturning Quill concerns the number
of direct shipping permits that have been issued to out-of-state wineries.324 As
discussed below, this observation provides further support to the lack of
administrative burdens argument.
A recent example is Pennsylvania.325 In August 2016, a new law went into
effect in Pennsylvania causing it to be the 44th state to allow out-of-state winery

317. See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-Granholm
Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 505,
506 (2008); Green, supra, note 235, at 39–40.
318. See, e.g., Green, supra note 235, at 39.
319. See, e.g., SOVOS SHIPCOMPLIANT, supra note 269.
320. See, e.g., State Shipping Laws for Wineries, SHIPCOMPLIANT, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant
.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
321. See supra notes 262–311 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 288, at 38.
323. See, e.g., Maria Koklanaris, South Dakota Sees Compliance with New Remote Sales Tax Law
Despite Legal Challenges, STATE TAX TODAY, Aug. 24, 2016.
324. See infra notes 325–344 and accompanying text.
325. See infra notes 326–329 and accompanying text.
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direct shipping.326 As with most other states,327 in order to obtain the direct shipping
permit, Pennsylvania requires out-of-state wineries to agree to comply with both
excise tax obligations and use tax collection responsibilities.328 As little as five
months later, Pennsylvania regulators reported they had already issued more than
700 direct shipping permits, which experts report is “a very rapid start-up compared
to other states.”329 This begs the question: if the collection of use taxes is so
administratively burdensome, then why would the number of out-of-state wineries
desiring to obtain a direct-shipping permit occur at such a rapid pace?
Another example is Texas. Texas also requires out-of-state wineries to
agree to collect use taxes in order to obtain a direct shipping permit.330 The number
of direct shipping permits issued by Texas to out-of-state wineries is listed below for
each of the noted fiscal years:






Fiscal year ended August 31, 2015: 681331
Fiscal year ended August 31, 2014: 581332
Fiscal year ended August 31, 2013: 659333
Fiscal year ended August 31, 2012: 518334
Fiscal year ended August 31, 2011: 585335

326. See, e.g., FREE THE GRAPES!, http://freethegrapes.org/free-the-grapes-update/ (last visited June
19, 2017); Alex Koral, A Keyston Change—Pennsylvania to Allow Direct to Consumer Sales of Wine,
SHIPCOMPLIANT (June 8, 2016), https://www.shipcompliant.com/blog/2016/06/08/keystone-rule-changepennsylvania-allow-direct-consumer-sales-wine/ (“Pennsylvania technically [already allowed] DtC sales
of wine. However, the difficulty of getting a DtC license, and the strict requirement that sales be fulfilled
through state-controlled liquor stores effectively prohibit[ed] the practice. But the new rules resemble the
standard DtC rules propagated by Wine Institute and Free the Grapes!, meaning that sales of DtC wine to
Pennsylvania residents will look much like they do in any other state.”); Direct Wine Shipment Tax
Bulletin 16-001, supra note 279 (“On June 8, 2016, Governor Tom Wolf signed into law Act 39 of 2016,
amending the Liquor Code to provide for various consumer convenience initiatives including direct
shipment of wine from out-of-state wine producers to residents of this commonwealth.”).
327. There are a handful of exceptions, one of which is Florida, which doesn’t require a shipping
permit or sales/use tax collection. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 278300 and accompanying text.
329. DTC Wine Symposium 2017 Sets Records, FREE THE GRAPES!, (Feb. 15, 2017), http://
freethegrapes.org/dtc-wine-symposium-2017-sets-records/; see also Erin Kirschenmann, State of the
States: 2016 Banner Year for DTC Shipping, WINE BUSINESS.COM (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.
winebusiness.com/news/?go=getArticle&dataid=179038.
330. See Information and Instructions for Out-of-State Winery Direct Shipper’s Permit, supra note
270; see also Winery Shipping Laws, TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, https://www.tabc.
state.tx.us/laws/texas_wine.asp (announcing the Texas legislation allowing direct wine shipping signed
by Governor Rick Perry on May 9, 2005.) (last visited May 3, 2018).
331. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2015 (2015), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_archives/NFR2015.pdf.
332. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2014 (2014), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_archives/NFR2014.pdf.
333. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2013, (2013) https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_ archives/NFR2013.pdf.
334. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2012, (2012) https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_ archives/NFR2012.pdf.
335. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2011 (2011), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_ archives/NFR2011.pdf.
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Fiscal year ended August 31, 2010: 494336
Fiscal year ended August 31, 2009: 861337
Fiscal year ended August 31, 2008: 685338

With the exception of 2010, the number of direct shipping permits issued
by Texas has stayed relatively constant since 2008.339 And the dip in 2010 was likely
not caused by a decline in out-of-state wineries seeking permits, but instead because
it was during this time that Texas went from requiring the re-submission of permit
applications on an annual basis to requiring re-submissions every other year.340
Fiscal year 2010 would have been the first year affected by this change.341
Surveying these figures is not meant to be an empirical study; rather, it is
only meant to provide some observations. The numbers would seem to indicate a
steady number of out-of-state wineries seeking to obtain direct shipping permits.342
Of course, looking at Texas by way of example, the numbers could represent out-ofstate wineries getting a permit for one year, never seeking to renew thereafter, and
then each subsequent year the permit numbers are brand new out-of-state wineries
seeking a first-time permit, with the same cycle continuing.343 While possible, that
scenario is probably not likely. The more probable scenario is that most permit
applications are renewals.
All this again goes to the question: if the collection of use taxes is so
administratively burdensome, then why would the number of out-of-state wineries
(again, many of which are small businesses)344 desiring to obtain a direct-shipping
permit be constant?
v.

Reliance Interests of Distributors on 3-Tier System

A last observation from Granholm is the Court’s failure to discuss the
reliance interests of distributors.345
A fundamental part of the Court’s analysis in Quill was the reliance interests
of the catalog mail order industry.346 The Court stated in Quill:

336. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2010 (2010), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_archives/NFR2010.pdf.
337. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2009 (2009), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_archives/NFR2009.pdf.
338. TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF NONFINANCIAL DATA FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2008 (2008), https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/publications/agency_report_archives/NFR2008.pdf.
339. See supra notes 331–338.
340. See, e.g., Winery Shipping Laws, TEX. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMM’N, (Sep. 1, 2009)
https://www.tabc.state.tx.us/laws/texas_wine.asp (“Out-of-state wineries are required to obtain from the
TABC an out-of-state winery direct shipper’s permit prior to shipping. The annual state fee for an out-ofstate winery direct shipper’s permit is $75, plus an additional surcharge of $160. A statutory change
required TABC to begin issuing two-year permits in 2009, so the total cost of a direct shipper’s permit is
$470 every two years.”).
341. See id.
342. See infra notes 331–338.
343. See infra notes 331–338.
344. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
345. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
346. See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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[T]he Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and has
become part of the basic framework of a sizeable industry. The
“interest in stability and orderly development of the law” that
undergirds the doctrine of stare decisis, see Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), therefore
counsels adherence to settled precedent.347
In Granholm, the distributors (i.e., Tier 2 in the 3-tier system) also had a
reliance interest.348 Just like catalog retailers had “engendered substantial reliance”
on the physical presence standard, which became the “basic framework” of the
catalog industry, distributors also engender substantial reliance on the 3-tier system,
which has become the basic framework of their existence.349
While Granholm did not invalidate the 3-tier system,350 it did seem to erode
away at it by allowing distributors to be taken out of the chain with respect to the
direct shipping sales.351 Indeed, it has been reported that “[w]holesalers and retailers
are usually the opponents to direct wine shipping laws that would loosen
restrictions. . . . They believe that any infringement on their current monopolies will
hurt their businesses.”352 In an article published around the time when the direct
shipping issue began to heat up, it was written that “[t]he wholesaler’s monopoly has
flourished under the three-their distribution system.”353
Similar to the Court in Quill finding significance in the mail-order
industry’s reliance on the physical presence standard, the Court in Granholm could
have likewise noted the reliance interests of distributors if it so desired.354 The Court
in Granholm, however, did not even mention the reliance interests of distributors.355
Although this analogy is admittedly comparing apples to oranges, it still seemed
worth mentioning because of the stronghold distributors historically have held in the
alcohol marketplace pre-Granholm.356 The significance is that perhaps it is an
indication that the current Court is not as quick to put emphasis on reliance interests
of particular industries when advances in technology (i.e., the Internet) have caused
marketplace changes.357
VI. CONCLUSION
This question was posed in the introduction: in today’s age of technology,
does it really matter where we are physically present? Largely because of the
347. Id. at 317.
348. See supra notes 222–230 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 222–230 and accompanying text.
350. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 48889.
351. See, e.g., What’s the Three Tier System and Why Is It Corroding?, WINE FOLLY (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://winefolly.com/update/three-tier-system/.
352. See, e.g., NELSON BARBER & TIM DODD, ANALYSIS OF STATE DIRECT WINE SHIPPING LAWS
(2006), http://www.depts.ttu.edu/hs/texaswine/docs/technical_report_0603.pdf.
353. James J. Molnar, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws Are a Violation of the
Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 169, 173 (2001).
354. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
355. See Id.
356. See supra notes 222–230.
357. See Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (2016).
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Internet, as far as purchasing retail items, where we (as buyers) or companies (as
sellers) are physically present does not really seem to matter anymore. For example,
a person in rural Montana can buy items online, just as if that person was shopping
in a brick-and-mortar store in New York City, Dallas, or San Francisco. Or an
Internet business having employees and offices only in Chicago could sell products
to customers located in all 50 states.
Even though it seems the concept of physical presence has become a bygone
of the past, the legal world still talks about it because of the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.358 There have been many excellent articles
written about how the time has come to “Kill Quill.”359 Hopefully, this article has
helped provide additional support to the “Kill Quill” movement by looking to the
wine industry and the aftereffects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm
v. Heald.360
As this article analogized to the wine industry, I thought appropriate to end
on a similar note. Even though we oftentimes hear about wines becoming better with
age, according to Wine Spectator, many wines have an expiration date.361 So too it
has actually been said about Quill . . . by Justice Gorsuch. While he was still sitting
on the bench for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch
stated in the Tenth Circuit’s DMA opinion that Quill may also have “a sort of
expiration date.”362 Cheers to that!

358. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
359. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
360. See discussion supra Part V.
361. See, e.g., Ask Dr. Vinny, WINE SPECTATOR (May 25, 2015), http://www.winespectator.com/
drvinny/show/id/51646.
362. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Jonathan E.
Maddison & Michael A. Jacobs, The Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch: One More Vote to Kill Quill?,
REED SMITH CLIENT ALERT (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/02/thenomination-of-judge-neil-gorsuch-one-more-vote.

